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1
 
 
1. Prologue: The Bretton Woods Institutions Economic Policy Programme 
 
Although in the post-World War II period as a whole, developing countries have made substantial 
economic and industrial progress, during the last decade or so, many of them, particularly in Latin 
America and Africa, have been in an acute economic crisis
2
.  As a consequence, these countries have 
been obliged to go to the  Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) for economic assistance for stabilisation 
and structural adjustment.  Such assistance has, however, normally only been forthcoming subject to 
conditionality, both short and long term
3
.  Implicit in this conditionality is a specific approach to 
economic policy for achieving long term economic growth. Central to this perspective are two 
elements: 
 
i. An increase in the role of free markets and private enterprise as far as possible and a diminution in that 
of the state.  Hence the BWI espousal of measures such as privatization, deregulation, financial 
                                                 
    
1
This paper brings together my previous work in this area.  It draws on and extends the analyses in 
Singh (1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b).  
    
2
 For an analysis of the reasons for this crisis, see among others Dornbusch (1985); Singh (1986a, 
1992a); World Bank (1991) and various issues of  UNCTAD'S Trade and Development Report. For a 
discussion of the intercontinental differences and specifically for the reasons why the Asian countries by 
and large escaped the economic crisis of the 1980s and the Latin American countries did not, see the 
analysis in Section 8 below and the literature cited therein. 
    
3
 For an anlysis of the increasingly detailed and overlapping conditionality of the World Bank and the 
IMF, see Avramovich(1988). In priciple the IMF is supposed to deal with the short-term adjustment 
problems and the World Bank with the long-term questions of economic development. Avramovich 
suggests that in practice, because of cross conditionality, the IMF's own structural adjustment loans, and 
the greater co-operation between the two institutions, the distinction has become much blurred.  
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liberalization, changes in taxation and other  incentive systems. This reduced role for the state, is 
encapsulated in the World Bank concept of a 'market-friendly' approach to development. 
 
ii. A close integration with the world economy.  Hence the emphasis in BWI structural adjustment 
programmes on export promotion, import liberalization, bringing domestic prices in line with the world 
market prices through changes in the exchange rate, promotion of foreign investment. 
 
Denying any philosophical or ideological proclivities, the IMF and the World Bank as well as many 
orthodox economists argue that they favour such a policy programme on the basis of its empirical 
validity and its proven record in promoting fast and "efficient" economic growth.  Thus De La Rosiere 
(the former Managing Director of the IMF): "Advocacy of these policies is not a matter of theology.  It 
is instead grounded in the lessons of actual country experience."
4
   
 
In two widely influential studies - World Bank(1991),hereafter referred to as the Development 
Challenge, and World Bank(1993), hereafter referred to as the East Asian Miracle - World Bank 
economists have also explicitly set out this policy perspective and provided analyses and evidence in 
support of it. The economic experience of the outstandingly successful East Asian economies over the 
last three decades plays a key role in these studies. The East Asian Miracle, which deals with the 
economic record specifically of these countries, argues that notwithstanding evidence of widespread 
and heavy government intervention in these economies, their experience is fully compatible with the 
World Bank structural adjustment programmes and the kind of policy advice outlined above, that the 
Bank has been offering to developing countries around the globe. 
 
The World Bank's views on East Asian economic development are controversial and have been 
                                                 
    
4
  De La Rosiere (1986), page 308. For an expression of similar views by the current managing director 
of the IMF, see the IMF Survey, 10 December, 
1990. 
 
 
 6 
vigorously challenged by a number of economists, not all of whom are heterodox.
5
  World Bank 
economists, however, apparently believe that the East Asian Miracle basically closes the chapter on the 
analyses and the lessons to be learnt from the economic record of that region. Thus, Lynn Squire(1993), 
Director, Research Department at the World Bank: 
 
"Let me now turn to the question of future research. In very broad terms, I see two possible directions. 
One avenue would take as its starting point the view that there is still a lot to learn about the East Asian 
experience, and that the focus should be on the still-unanswered questions. The other approach while 
acknowledgeing that there are a lot of unanswered questions, would take as its initial position the view 
that the real issue is the relevance of the East Asian experience for other developing countries. 
 
While there is undoubtedly scope for research in both areas, I would like to suggest that the emphasis 
ought to be on the second. . . . now the East Asian study is completed, the research agenda lies more in 
Africa and other developing countries than it does in East Asia". 
 
This paper will argue that Mr. Squire's proposed closure of the debate on East Asian development 
record is a trifle premature. It will be suggested that this debate has certainly made progress and has led 
to a degree of convergence between the Bank and its critics on some analytical and empirical issues. 
However, key questions are still unresolved and the analyses of the East Asian Miracle have raised fresh 
matters. More importantly, there is a wide chasm between the two schools on the policy implications of 
the East Asian experience. 
 
The chief purpose of this paper is to carry this debate further by identifying and commenting on some of 
the most important issues which still remain in contention. The paper will, inter alia,also  outline an 
alternative framework for examining the question of the nature and degree of a country's desirable 
integration with the world economy, which leads to a rather different policy conclusion than that at (ii) 
above. It will be argued here that, in contrast to the recommendations of the Bretton Woods institutions 
(BWIs),  developing countries should actively seek  `strategic' rather than  `close' integration with 
                                                 
    
5
 See the review articles on the East Asian Miracle in Amsden (1994).  For earlier contributions see, in 
particular, Amsden (1989); Wade (1990); Boltho (1985); Singh (1993b). 
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the international economy.  Further, with respect to (i), the present paper will suggest that government 
needs to have a far bigger role in economic activity than is envisaged in the 'market-friendly' approach.  
It will be contended that in mixed economy countries with reasonably effective states, the government 
should pursue a dynamic industrial policy to bring about the desired structural transformations in the 
economy as speedily as possible,in order to achieve fast economic growth. These, it will be argued, are 
the correct lessons to be learnt from the East Asian economic record.  
 
Taking into account previous contributions to the debate, the paper concentrates on the following 
specific issues: 
 
(a) the question of the effectiveness of industrial policy;  
 
(b) the issue of 'openness'; how open were the East Asian economies during their periods of fast growth 
? 
 
(c) the nature of competition in domestic product and capital markets;  
 
(d) the role of savings and investment in East Asian economic growth. 
 
(e) the question why the East Asian countries did not have a debt crisis whilst the Latin Americans did. 
 
(f) the relationship between technology policy, industrial policy and international competitiveness.  
 
(g) the relationship between the 'fundamentals', macro-economic stability and industrial policy. 
 
Particular attention will be paid here to the theoretical underpinnings of the World Bank analyses of 
these issues. Specifically, the neglect of the role of 'demand' in such analyses will be highlighted. This, 
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it will be shown, leads to incorrect interpretations of the East Asian development record at key stages of 
the Bank's argument. For space reasons, and also to sharpen the debate, the empirical analysis will be 
confined here to Japan and South Korea - two of the most important exemplar countries. It will be 
shown that a proper consideration of the role of the balance of payments constraint and of demand leads 
to a rather different interpretation of the experience of these economies from that provided by World 
Bank economists. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main analytical  theses and the policy 
recommendations of both the Development Challenge and the East Asian Miracle. Section 3 comments 
on the total factor productivity approach to economic growth which is the theoretical foundation of the 
Bank's analysis. Section 4 considers the central issue of the efficacy of industrial policy in Japan and 
South Korea. It outlines the conceptual issues involved in defining industrial policy and assessing its 
success or failure. The East Asian Miracle's  industrial policy ineffectiveness theorem is examined in 
section 5 in the light of the foregoing analysis. Section 6 considers the question of openness and section 
7 that of competition in domestic markets. The salient question of how the East Asian countries were 
able to avoid the debt crisis in the 1980s which so completely crippled the Latin Americans in that 'lost 
decade' is considered in section 8.  Section 9 considers the role of savings and investment in East Asian 
economic growth. The inter-relationship between industrial policy, technology policy, international 
competitiveness and macro economic stability are examined in section 10. Section 11 concludes and 
outlines the main issues for further research which the East Asian experience raises and which continue 
to be extremely important and relevant for both development theory and policy. 
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: THE MAIN 
THESES 
 
World Bank(1991,1993) are seminal works which provide a comprehensive account of the Bank 
economists' thinking on development problems and their conclusions on public policy. The 1991 
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Development Challenge is important because, in the words of the then President of the World Bank, Mr 
Barber Conable, it "synthesises and interprets the lessons of forty years of development experience" by 
Bank economists. The significance of the 1993 East Asian Miracle lies in the fact that the Bank 
economists invariably justify their policy advice to developing countries around the world by reference 
to the experience of the sustained fast growth of the East Asian economies. However,the two studies 
complement each other and need to be studied together. The first provides the Bank's general analytical 
framework and its broad market-oriented approach to development issues. The second, as noted earlier, 
argues that, notwithstanding heavy government intervention in East Asia, the experience of these 
countries is still compatible with the 1991 Report's recommendation of a 'market-friendly' approach, 
and therefore does not necessitate any significant departures in the Bank's policy advice. 
 
The starting point for the Development Challenge is the question:  why during the last four decades 
some developing countries have been successful in the sense of substantially raising their per capita 
incomes whilst other have not?  The central analytical argument is that economic growth is determined 
essentially by the growth of total factor productivity of capital and labour.  The Development 
Challenge's analyses comes to the conclusion that the more open an economy, the greater the degree of 
competition and the higher its investment in education, the greater would be its growth of total factor 
productivity and hence its overall economic growth.  Although the significance of the international 
economic factors was recognised, a major argument of the study was that domestic policy matters far 
more for raising per capita incomes than world economic conditions. 
 
The Development Challenge stated:  "Economic theory and practical experience suggest that 
(government) interventions are likely to help provided they are market-friendly" (p. 5).  In order for 
`market-friendly' not to be a mere tautology, the study, to its credit, defined the concept fairly precisely 
in the following terms: 
a.  Intervene reluctantly.  Let markets work unless it is demonstrably better to step in...  [It] is usually 
a mistake for the state to carry out physical production, or to protect the domestic production of a good 
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that can be imported more cheaply and whose local production offers few spillover benefits. 
b.  Apply checks and balances.  Put interventions continually to the discipline of international and 
domestic markets. 
c.  Intervene openly.  Make interventions simple, transparent and subject to rules rather than official 
discretion. 
 
Overall, the state's role in economic development in this 'market-friendly' approach is regarded as being 
important but best limited to providing the social, legal and economic infrastructure, to creating a 
suitable climate for private enterprise, but also, significantly, to ensure a high level and appropriate 
composition of human capital formation. Even this limited role for the state is, nevertheless, an advance 
over the earlier neo-classical thinking which enjoined governments simply to avoid distortions, and just 
provide a stable macro-economic environment and a reliable legal framework. 
 
Both the neo-classical and the 'market friendly' analyses have encountered serious intellectual 
difficulties since neither can satisfactorily explain the outstanding success of East Asian economies. 
Heterodox authors, such as Amsden(1989), Wade(1990), Singh(1993a,1993b), Boltho(1985) have 
pointed out that in countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the government has played a leading 
and a heavily interventionist role in the course of their economic development.  
 
The Development Challenge stated, "The central question of this Report is why countries like Japan 
have succeeded so spectacularly while others have failed." Singh(1993b), therefore, suggested that the 
relevant issue is to what extent, if any, the Japanese followed the Report's prescriptions and a 
'market-friendly' approach to development. Did the Japanese government intervene in the markets 
'reluctantly': did it for example leave the prices and production priorities to be determined by the market 
forces and simply provide the necessary infrastructure for private enterprise to flourish? How 
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'transparent' was the government intervention in Japanese industry? To achieve this colossal economic 
success, how closely did the Japanese economy integrate with the world economy?  
 
The Development  Challenge did acknowledge the inescapable fact that there was considerable 
government intervention in the course of post-War Japanese development. The important issue, 
however, is whether the Report's characterisation of this intervention and lessons to be drawn from it are 
valid. Singh called attention to the overwhelming evidence which showed that the governments in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did not intervene (a) either reluctantly or (b) transparently in any of 
these economies. Specifically, in their periods of fast economic growth, the governments in Japan 
(1950-73) and South Korea used a wide array of interventionist instruments including: import controls; 
control over foreign exchange allocations; provision of subsidised credit, often at negative real interest 
rates, to favoured firms and industries; control over multi-national investment and foreign equity 
ownership; heavy subsidisation and 'coercion' of exports, particularly in Korea; a highly active state 
technology policy; restrictions on domestic competition and government encouragement of a variety of 
cartel arrangements in the product markets; promotion of conglomerate enterprises through mergers 
and other government measures (Korea). The government in these countries, not only intervened at the 
sectoral level, but also far more intrusively at the level of the individual firm through the so called 
'administrative guidance'.   
 
Singh concluded that between them, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did all the things which the 
'market-friendly' approach to development is not supposed to do. Above all, all three countries followed 
an 'industrial strategy'- a set of policies to deliberately change the market prices and production 
priorities - which is explicitly ruled out by this approach. The Development Challenge acknowledged 
that there was significant state intervention in all these three countries but argued that 'these economies 
refute the case for thoroughgoing dirigism as convincingly as they refute the case for `laissez-faire' 
(p.5). Heterodox economists agree that the experience of these countries is certainly an argument 
against laissez-faire; nor does it provide any support for "command" planning of production of the 
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Soviet-type, which in effect supplants the market altogether. However, for mixed economy developing 
countries with effective governments, these economists suggest that the post-War East Asian economic 
history is unequivocally an argument for adopting an industrial strategy, for guiding the market, and not 
following the hands-off 'market-friendly' approach as enunciated in the Report.
6
 
 
2.1  As a response to these criticisms,
7
 the East Asian Miracle has produced a new analysis of the 
economic development of the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) including Japan. This study 
fully acknowledges the facts of enormous government interventions in these countries. Thus, the 
Report: 
policy interventions took many forms - targetted and subsidised credit to selected industries, low 
deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings, protection of 
domestic import industries, the establishment and financial support of government banks, public 
investment in applied research, firm- and industry-specific export targets, development of export 
marketing institutions, and wide sharing of information between public and private sectors. Some 
industries were promoted while others were not (p.6). 
 
 
 
However, the Report goes on to suggest that such interventions, particularly in the sphere of industrial 
policy, had in general a limited effect. Some of these worked for some of the time in a few countries, but 
overall they were neither neccessary nor sufficient for the extraordinary success of these countries. 
Thus, the East Asian Miracle:  
"What are the main factors that contributed to the HPAE's superior allocation of physical and human 
capital to high yielding investments and their ability to catch up technologically? Mainly, the answer 
lies in fundamentally sound, market oriented policies. Labour markets were allowed to work. Financial 
markets, ... generally had low distortions and limited subsidies compared with other developing 
economies. Import substitution was ... quickly accompanied by the promotion of exports. ... the result 
was limited differences between international relative prices and domestic relative prices in the 
HPAE's. Market forces and competitive pressures guided resources into activities that were consistent 
with comparative advantage ...". (Page 325). 
 
 
                                                 
    
6
 The question of 'openness' of the East Asian economies during the period of fast economic growth is 
considered later.  
    
7
 Apart from these academic attacks on the World Bank's theses on the East Asian economies, there 
was importantly criticism from the Japanese government. See Shiratori(1993) and Lall,(1994).  
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In other words, the final policy conclusion, is still essentially the 'market- friendly' approach to 
development, albeit, in a new packaging. Developing countries are recommended to seek their 
comparative advantage, to get the prices right, to have free markets as far as possible.  Such policy 
conclusions are very much in accord with the basic analytical paradigm of the Development Challenge:  
"Competitive markets are the best way yet found for efficiently organising the production and 
distribution of goods and services.  Domestic and external competition provides the incentives that 
unleash entrepreneurship and technological progress"(page 1).    
 
3. PRODUCTIVITY, GROWTH AND INVESTMENT   
 
3.1 The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Approach to Economic Growth 
 
The theoretical foundation of the World Bank analyses is the TFP approach to economic growth. It is 
suggested that inter-country and inter-temporal variations in growth rates are caused by variations in 
total factor productivity of capital and labour.  Changes in the latter variable are thought to be 
determined mainly by economic policy - the degree of openness of an economy, the extent of 
competition in the product and factor markets, and investment in physical and human capital 
(education), particularly the latter.  The underlying chain of causation is that competition and 
education promote technical progress, and therefore TFP growth and hence economic expansion.  
"Free mobility of people, capital, and technology" and "free entry and exit of firms" are regarded as 
being particularly conducive to the spread of knowledge and technical change.  
 
Now at a theoretical level, there are several well-known objections to the causal model underlying the 
TFP approach to economic growth. The model assumes for example full employment of resources and 
perfect competition, none of which obtain in the real world.  Moreover, it is a wholly supply-side 
model which ignores altogether the role of demand factors.
8
 The latter, as we shall see below, is a 
                                                 
    
8
There is an enormous literature on the subject.  For a lucid analysis of the relevant issues under 
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critical weakness which creates serious difficulties for the Bank's analyses of the East Asian as well as 
other economies. 
 
With respect to  empirical evidence, even a cursory consideration of the data presented by Bank 
economists themselves in the Development Challenge (see table 1) reveals the serious limitations of the 
TFP approach. The table provides figures for the growth of GDP, capital and labour inputs and TFP, 
separately for each of the sub-periods, 1960-73 and 1973-87, for each of the five developing regions as 
well as for a group of 68 developing economies; in addition, it also provides similar information for 
each of the four leading industrial economies. These data show that in every region, and for each 
country or group of countries shown in the table except South Asia (ie. in nine out of ten observations), 
the rate of growth of TFP fell substantially during 1973-87, compared with 1960-73. For example, TFP 
growth fell in East Asian developing economies from 2.6 percent p.a. in the first period to 1.3 percent 
p.a. in the second period; in Latin America, the corresponding figures were 1.3 percent p.a. and -0.4 
percent p.a.; for the group of 68 developing economies, the TFP growth fell from 1.3 percent to -0.2 
percent over the two periods. However, in South Asia - notably the only region which registered a trend 
increase in its GDP growth between the two periods - TFP growth rose from zero in 1960-73 to 1.2 
percent p.a. during 1973-87.  
 
In terms of the causal model underlying the World Bank analysis,  this almost universal fall in TFP 
growth in the recent period would be due to policy mismanagement - low rates of technical progress 
caused by distortions, lack of competition, lack of integration with the world economy, etc.  The 
evidence, however, is not compatible with such an analysis, since as Bank economists themselves note 
there has actually been more competition, greater integration of the world economy, less distortions in 
most developing countries in the latter period (particularly in the 1980s) than in the former. 
 
These facts are much more in accord with an alternative theoretical model (Verdoorn's Law) which 
                                                                                                                                                                     
discussion here, see Nelson [1981]. 
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would suggest that the fall in the world and the national economic growth rates in the post-1973 period 
was responsible for the decline in the rate of growth of productivity in most regions. Verdoorn's Law
9
 
predicts that the faster (slower) the growth of production, the faster (slower) the growth of productivity. 
Regression analysis shows the following relationship between the two variables in Table 1. 
 
p = -.17 + .59q 
    (-.54)   (3.8) 
R2 =  .60 
 
Where p is the change in the growth rate of productivity and q is the change in the growth rate of output 
between the two periods. Parentheses give t values of the coefficients. 
 
 The decline in world economic growth after 1973, in terms of this model, was due to a lower rate of 
growth of world and national demand caused by a whole range of factors (e.g. the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, the growth of real wages in a number of industrial countries outstripping 
productivity growth in the wake of the first oil shock) connected with the fall of the Golden Age of 
development of the OECD economies.
10
 
 
 
3.2 TFP and the East Asian Growth Process 
 The specific analysis of the East Asian growth process in the East Asian Miracle also raises similar 
                                                 
    
9
The classic references here are Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor (1966). For a review, see Mcombie 
(1987).  
    
10
 The period 1950-73, when the OECD economy grew at an unprecedented rate of almost 5% per 
annum ─ twice its historic trend rate of growth ─ has rightly been termed the Golden Age of capitalism. 
Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh, (1990) provide a detailed analysis of why the Golden Age rose in the 
first place and why it fell following the 1973 oil shock.  See also Maddison [1982]; Bruno and Sachs 
[1985]; Kindleberger [1992]. To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasised that we are not 
considering here the question of short term monetary demand management, but rather that of the forces 
which affect the long term rate of growth of real demand.  
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serious intellectual difficulties.  The empirical analysis of the East Asian Miracle shows that the high 
rates of investment in the East Asian countries made an important contribution to their economic 
growth.  However, this analysis also points to the conclusion that investments in these countries were 
more efficiently utilised and hence were more productive than elsewhere. The study's estimates of the 
TFP growth rates indicate that these were  considerably higher in the 'Miracle' countries than in other 
developing economies. The East Asian Miracle notes: "What is most striking, however, is how little we 
are able to account for differences in growth rates between the HPAEs and other economies on the basis 
of conventional economic variables. We are able, in the end, to predict only about 17% of the actual 
differences in growth rates between the HPAEs and Latin America.  We do somewhat better between 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the HPAEs, predicting about 36% of the difference. Controlling for their 
superior rates of accumulation, the HPAEs still outperform while Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America underperform the statistical relationship between accumulation and growth, leaving much of 
the regional difference in per capita income growth unexplained (even though a large fraction of HPAE 
success is explained). They have been apparently more successful in allocating the resources that they 
accumulated to high productivity activities and in adopting and mastering catch up technologies." [P54; 
underlining added. Endnotes in the passage omitted as these did not affect the argument.]  
 
However, important empirical  studies on TFP growth in East Asian countries by Young(1994) and 
Lawrence and Lau (1992) contradict the World Bank findings and provide indirect support for the 
UNCTAD\ Rodrik view. To illustate, Young's cross-country estimates of TFP growth ( reproduced in 
table 2 for  a selection of countries), based on purchasing power parity data, show that Korea and 
Taiwan had lower TFP growth than did Bangladesh! Similarly Kim and Lau's econometric analysis 
(1992) of "meta production functions" across countries shows that South Korea and Taiwan have 
experienced hardly any technical progress at all. In other words, in terms of the TFP methodology, most 
if not the whole of economic growth of countries like Korea can be explained by the fast expansion of 
factor inputs, including inter alia capital inputs arising from very high rates of capital accumulation   
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An interesting neo-classical interpretation of these new empirical findings on TFP growth in East Asia 
is provided by Krugman (1994).  He argues on the basis of these results that the high growth rates of 
the East Asian miracle economies are not sustainable. This in his view is for the following reasons. It is 
unrealistic to expect that countries which are already investing 40 % of their GDP will be able to raise 
their rate of investment much higher still. Krugman goes on to point out that these countries similarly 
already have highly educated and high quality labour forces which limits the scope for further 
improvement in these sphere as well. In these circumstances, without technical progress, eventual 
decreasing returns to investment will set in and limit the growth potential of these economies.   
 
However, on the basis of the classical (non neo-classical) paradigm, UNCTAD economists [see 
UNCTAD, 1994; Akyuz and Gore, 1994]  provide a radically different interpretation of these 
empirical phenomena.  UNCTAD economists suggest that the high growth rates of the exemplar East 
Asian countries were mostly, if not entirely, due to their high rates of accumulation. In this paradigm, 
there is no reason why eventual decreasing returns should set in with high rates of investment since 
technical change is regarded as being 'embodied' in new capital goods, high rates of investment lead to 
faster technical progress, greater learning by doing, and through cumulative causation to a virtuous 
circle of greater competitiveness and faster economic growth. So what matters most in the UNCTAD 
view is not static resource allocation and getting prices 'right' or 'wrong', but the dynamics of the 
accumulation process  and the associated technical change and the growth of productivity.
11
  
  
 
4. EFFICACY OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
The TFP approach is prominently used in the East Asian Miracle's critique of the industrial policy thesis 
of the revisionist economists. One of that study's most controversial findings is what may be called, by 
                                                 
    
11
. Rodrik(1994b) also regards high rates of investment as the key variable in East Asian success, 
although his underlying causal model is rather different from that of the UNCTAD economists. 
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analogy to Lucas' well known theorem, the industrial policy ineffectiveness doctrine. The study asserts 
that contrary to popular perceptions, rigorous analysis shows that these policies were largely 
ineffective. Thus the East Asian Miracle in relation, for example, to Korea: 
 
"Moving away from the anecdotes about individual chaebol, the quantitative importance of government 
intervention to alter the structure of production is not confirmed at the sectoral level." (p.333) 
 
The clear message of the study is that if industrial policies could not succeed in the East Asian countries 
with their highly efficient bureaucracies, ipso facto these would be inappropriate for the rest of the 
developing world which is not blessed with such high quality administrative assets.  
 
Before examining the specific analyses put forward in the East Asian Miracle in support of this 
contention, there are two important conceptual issues which require attention: what is industrial 
policy?; how should the "success" or otherwise of such a policy be assessed? 
 
4.1  What is Industrial Policy? 
 
Governments in almost all market economy countries intervene to a greater or a smaller degree in the 
operation of their industries. For example, even the US government, normally regarded as 
non-interventionist, in fact, intervenes in industry through a variety of measures, e.g. anti-trust laws, 
industrial standards, pollution regulations, labour laws, infrastructural and defense expenditure as well 
as in a variety of other ways. However, most people would agree that despite such extensive 
interventions, the US does not have an 'industrial policy', while Japan and East Asian countries do. 
 
What makes Japanese interventions into an industrial policy and the US interventions not?  An 
essential answer to this question is that in Japan, the myriad of government policies affecting industry 
are coordinated and viewed as a coherent whole, and the government has a strategic view of the 
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country's industrial development in relation to the world economy.  In this sense South Korea, and 
other East Asian countries also have an industrial policy.  Japan's strategic view in the 1950s and 60s 
was eloquently expressed by Vice Minister Ojimi of MITI as follows:  
The MITI decided to establish in Japan industries which require intensive employment of capital and 
technology, industries that in consideration of comparative cost of production should be the 
most inappropriate for Japan, industries such as steel, oil-refining, petro-chemicals, 
automobiles, aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and electronics, including electronic 
computers.  From a short-run, static viewpoint, encouragement of such industries would seem 
to conflict with economic rationalism.  But, from a long-range viewpoint, these are precisely 
the industries where income elasticity of demand is high, technological progress is rapid, and 
labour productivity rises fast. [OECD, 1972].   
 
 
At the end of World War II, the bulk of Japanese exports consisted of textiles and light manufactured 
goods.  In the view of Ojimi and his colleagues at MITI although such an economic structure may have 
conformed to the theory of comparative advantage (Japan being a labour-surplus economy at the time), 
it was not capable of raising, even in the long run, the Japanese standard of living to that of the European 
and American levels. One interpretation of Ojimi's argument above would be that the purpose of the 
Japanese industrial policy was no more than to pursue the country's dynamic comparative advantage, 
but to do that as quickly as possible. The other non neo-classical interpretation, which does not 
necessarily exclude the previous one, is that the purpose of the industrial policy was to guide the market 
to deliberately create a competitive advantage in areas where world demand was likely to rise rapidly 
and in which it would therefore be in Japan's long term interest to specialise. As Magaziner and Hout 
(1980) note: "On balance, Japan's industrial policy has been anticipating rather than reacting to 
international competitive evolution".    
 
Support for the non-neoclassical interpretation is provided by the fact that although in the 1950s and 
1960s, MITI's structural programme could be justified in orthodox terms by the infant industry 
argument, these structural policies have continued, albeit in an attenuated form, right up to the present 
day.  MITI continues to provide blueprints and to seek wide business and social agreement towards its 
future structural visions for the evolution of Japanese economy in the years ahead, as the world 
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competitive situation and Japan's role in the world economy changes. As Johnson, Tyson and Zysman 
[1989] note with respect to what they term Japan's developmental policy :"The pupose of policy was 
domestic development, and it grew out of a conviction that comparative advantage can be created by 
intentional government policy." 
 
Parenthetically, although this paper concentrates on the Japanese economic record for the period 
1950-1973 (because of its greater relevence to problems of developing countries),it is important to 
emphasize that there have been important changes in the subsequent period in the conduct of MITI's 
industrial policies. In general, MITI does not now have the same kind of coercive policy instruments 
(e.g. allocation of foreign exchange) as it did in the high growth period. Moreover, the economy is much 
too complex to be effectively controlled by government edicts. In addition, there has been continuing 
relentless pressure from abroad for liberalisation of the economy to which the government has 
reluctantly submitted. Nevertheless, as Johnson, Tyson and Zysman point out, the country's traditional 
developmental policy - based on protection of the home market and promotion of domestic industries 
through a variety of measures - continues. MITI has to use more indirect instruments as well as moral 
persuasion to a far larger degree than it did before.`Administrative guidance', MITI's close links with 
industry and trade associations and importantly, business practice, are the important policy tools in the 
new context. The industry policy focus would now appear to be on the so-called sunrise industries 
(i.e.,industries of the future such as biotechnology, new materials) and sunset industries (i.e., declining 
industries such as textile, steel and shipbuilding where Japan has lost its competitiveness). Johnson, 
Tyson and Zysman suggest that in response to liberalisation pressures of the post 1973 period, the 
government has implemented a "moving band of openness" in which "restrictions on the ability of 
foreign firms to develop a permanent presence in the Japanese market have been removed only where 
Japanese firms have already achieved a dominant position at home and a strong often dominant 
position abroad. In other words restrictions have been removed when they don't matter anymore". This 
may be an extreme position but its basic truth is corroborated by other students of Japanese industrial 
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policy.
12
 
 
4.2  Assessment of Industrial Policy 
 
How does one assess the success of an industrial policy like that of Japan during 1950-1973, the 
reference period for the present analysis ? It is not a straightforward question since one needs a credible 
counter-factual - what would have happened in the absence of industrial policy?  Would Japanese 
industrial production still have grown by nearly 13 per cent a year between 1953 to 1973, its GNP by 
nearly 10 per cent and its share in  world exports of manufactures change by a huge 10 percentage 
points? Since it is impossible to carry out a controlled experiment, one has to seek other ways of making 
such an assessment. However, this is not a new problem raised by the consideration of the Japanese 
industrial policy, but one which always confronts applied economists in their everyday work.  
 
One way to answer this kind of question in the absence of a controlled experiment, would be to compare 
the performance of countries which were in other relevant ways similar to Japan, but which did not have 
an industrial policy like that of Japan. This after all is the broad methodology underlying the 
Development Challenge itself which compares the experiences of different countries to find out why 
some were successful and others were not. A closer analogy would be the studies which assess the 
success of Bank's structural adjustment programmes by comparing countries which did have such 
programmes with those which did not. There are of course well recognised problems with such 
comparisons: to be able to provide satisfactory evidence on the issue the two groups of countries should 
be as similar as possible in all other ways.  
 
Similarly, a second way of assessing the success of Japanese industrial policy would be to compare the 
country's  post-war economic record under an industrial policy, with its own performance in the 
                                                 
    
12
. See further Okimoto [1989]; Dore [1986]. 
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pre-war period when it was not pursuing such policies. A third way of assessing the policy would be to 
examine it in terms of the goals which the country may have set for itself. In the Japanese case, during 
the period 1950-73, a very important proximate goal of MITI was to ensure a current account balance at 
as high a growth rate as possible. In other words, the balance of payments was seen as the main 
constraint on fast economic growth in this period. (Shinohara,1982; Tsuru,1993). The government 
pursued this objective by a wide range of measures including inter alia a policy of extensive import 
controls, together with the promotion of exports of certain key industries, which changed over time.  
 
Boltho (1985a, 1985b) examines the Japanese industrial policy on these criteria and concludes that the 
policy was successful. Boltho's analysis is complemented by Magaziner and Hout's (1980) detailed and 
careful evidence based on case studies of several specific industries. These strongly suggest that the 
industrial policies were successful in propelling the targetted industries into pre-eminence in 
international competition. So how do World Bank economists conclude that industrial policy in 
countries like Japan or South Korea was ineffective?  
 
5. THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY INEFFECTIVENESS DOCTRINE 
 
The first reason for such a negative assessment of industrial policy by the East Asian Miracle is that it 
has a very narrow definition of industrial policy.  The study states: "We define industrial policies, as 
distinct from trade policies, as government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote 
productivity-based growth." (p.304). In other words industrial policy is regarded only as a policy to 
upgrade industrial structure.  The East Asian Miracle makes no attempt to consider the industrial 
policy as a whole in all its various aspects. It also departs, without any justification, from the standard 
methodology outlined above for assessing the effectiveness of industrial policy. Instead, it adopts a 
so-called functional approach to examine three types of government interventions: (a) directed credit, 
(b) export promotion, and (c) structural policy. It comes to the conclusion that whereas (a) and (b) were 
successful, (c) was not.  
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There is no ackowledgement that (a) and (b) as well as other policies such as extensive import 
protection for the whole economy and not just the favoured sectors were closely connected with (c), and 
all three, together with other industrial policies should therefore be judged together. To recall the 
analogy with Bank's own structural adjustment programmes, the Bank's procedure in the present case 
amounts to an assessment of a single component of the structural adjustment programmes such as say 
devaluation, without reference to the interconnections with the rest of the programme. This is not to say 
that it is not an interesting and a legitimate exercise to consider the effectiveness of a single component 
of a structural adjustment programme (or of an industrial policy). However, to do that its links with the 
other components must be explicitly recognised. It also requires a much more elaborate counter-factual 
exercise e.g. simulation of a macro-econometric model, first with the structural adjustment programme, 
and then with one in which the component under reference is not considered.  
 
However, Bank economists have not carried out such research. The interconnections between different 
aspects of industrial policy in countries like Japan or Korea have either not been examined at all or as 
shown below, not correctly interpreted
13
. Nevertheless, within its own terms, the reasons for the 
rejection of the efficacy of industrial policy by the East Asian Miracle rests on two propositions:  
(1) That the industrial structure which emerged in industrial policy economies like Japan and South 
Korea was not all that different from what it would it would have been had these countries not 
had an industrial policy (i.e., the observed industrial structure was ex-post market conforming 
and accorded with the changing relative factor intensities and prices).  
(2) That the total factor productivity growth of the industrial policy favoured sectors was no different 
from that of the unfavoured sectors. 
  
                                                 
    
13
.Rodrik (1994a) provides an alternative critique of Bank economists' methodology on this issue.  He 
regards it as inappropriate to lump the three elements together because a) and b) are instruments and c) is 
an objective.  
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As tests of the ineffectiveness of industrial policy, even in this narrow sense, (1) and (2) are inadequate. 
To illustrate, suppose we take the neo-classical interpretation of Vice-Minister Ojimi's rationale for 
Japan's industrial policy noted earlier. In this interpretation, all that MITI was doing was pursuing 
Japan's dynamic comparative advantage, helping to create an industrial structure to accord with it. 
However, it was attempting to do so in as short a time as possible. The resulting industrial structure 
would of course in equilibrium be market conforming. So that even if it were true that the market forces, 
left to themselves, may have generated the same kind of industrial structure, it may have taken a much 
longer time to do so and hence resulted in a much lower rate of economic growth. Bank economists do 
not address this crucial issue of the speed of adjustment at all. 
  
The problem with the test (2) above is that it overlooks the effects of industrial policy on a country's 
balance of payments and its long term rate of growth of domestic demand. By confining its attention 
only to the supply side effects of productivity growth and technical change, as predicted by the TFP 
approach, the East Asian Miracle hypothesises that 'spillovers' of these activities will be confined only 
to the favoured sectors, or their close sub-sectors within the two digit industrial classification which 
they have analysed. However, to the extent that industrial policy helps to relieve the balance of 
payments constraint, most sectors will benefit from higher rates of growth of production and hence 
productivity (by Verdoorn's Law), and not just the favoured sectors. In other words, the spillovers will 
be universal.  
 
Thus test (2) cannot discriminate between industrial policy and non-industrial policy states
14
. To do 
that, one needs to look at the costs and benefits of industrial policy interventions in terms of their 
relieving the balance of payments constraint in the short and the long run. More specifically, it would 
require inter alia, an examination of the contribution of the favoured sectors to the growth of exports or 
                                                 
    
14
.On test (2), Kwon (1994) presents an empirical critique of  Bank economists conclusions with 
respect to Korea. He provides alternative estimates of TFP growth to show that in Korea, contrary to the 
East Asian Miracle, TFP growth in the favoured sectors was in fact higher than in the non-favoured 
sectors.  
 
 
 25 
to the reduction in the growth of imports over time.  
 
It is the failure to consider such factors which leads Bank economists to conclude that South Korea's 
Heavy Chemical industry (HCI) in the 1970s was unsuccessful, while heterodox economists suggest 
that it was a success. The reasons for these conflicting judgements are that Bank economists consider 
only the cost of the HCI drive but not its benefits to the long term trajectory of the country's balance of 
payments and hence to overall economic growth. Amsden(1994a) points out that the mainstay of 
Korea's celebrated export success in the 1980s was precisely these HCI industries.
15
 
  
Parenthetically, a related point which is relevant here is that the Bank economists ignore the fact that in 
Korea the industrial policy favoured sectors were not just the high capital intensity sectors but 
importantly these included textiles (precisely because of its contribution to the balance of payments) for 
most of the period. (see Chang, 1994). However, the Korean government knew as did the Japanese 
before them, that howsoever successful a country may be in the export of textiles, to sustain fast overall 
rates of growth of exports over time, it needs to regularly add new export products to the list.  Hence 
the need to continuously upgrade the industrial and export structure of the economy, albeit, if it pleases 
the Bank in accordance with the country's dynamic comparative advantage. However, it will be 
appreciated that the factor proportions Heckscher-Ohlin theory does not yield any precise predictions 
where a country's dynamic comparative advantage lies as it accumulates capital and skills. The theory 
predicts a movement towards skill intensive exports but does not specify which ones. In Japan and 
Korea, the government selected and nurtured these industries where it thought the country did, or 
should (in non neo-classical interpretation) have dynamic comparative advantage.  
 
                                                 
    
15
 The question of the time horizon over which the costs and benefits of industrial policy interventions 
are assessed is ofcourse crucial. Amsden and Singh(1994) point out that for thirty years there were few 
foreign cars to be seen on Korean roads and few Korean cars to be seen on foreign roads. In other words, 
the Korean government provided protection to the car industry for long periods of time because of the 
difficulties involved in the learning and the assimilation of foreign technonology in developing countries. 
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Bank economists seem to be unaware of an ironic implication of their analysis. If despite heavy 
government intervention, the Japanese and the Korean industrial structures still conformed to these 
countries' dynamic comparative advantage, a reasonable inference must be that on average the 
government was correctly able to 'pick the winners'! Hence, at this level of analysis, in Bank 
economists' own terms, the Japanese or the Korean industrial policies should be regarded as a success.  
 
To sum up, the above analysis indicates the Bank economists arrive at their industrial policy 
ineffectiveness doctrine by (a) considering industrial policy in a very narrow sense; (b) by ignoring its 
multi-facted character and the important linkages between its different components; and (c) even within 
their own terms by using inappropriate tests for assessing the success or otherwise of industrial policy. 
The first of their tests is flawed because it does not consider the critical issue of the speed of adjustment 
to a country's dynamic comparative advantage; the second is marred by the fact that it abstracts from the 
effects of industrial policy on the balance of payments constraint and hence on overall demand - issues 
which are critical in the real world of imperfect or incomplete markets in semi-industrial economies. 
The theoretical paradigm of TFP, with its assumptions of full utilisation of resources and perfect 
competition, which the Bank economists use is inappropriate for such analyses.      
 
6. OPENNESS: 'CLOSE' VERSUS 'STRATEGIC' INTEGRATION WITH THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
 
6.1  Degrees of Openness of the East Asian Economies 
 
The virtues of openness, international competition, close integration with the world economy, are 
stressed in several Bank publications (see in particular the Development Challenge). Evidence suggests, 
however, that these virtues were not in fact practised by either Japan or Korea, the two East Asian 
countries we concentrate on here. 
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With respect to the nature and extent of "openness" practiced by the East Asian economies, Table 2 
provides some relevant data on Japan.  It gives comparative figures on imports of manufacturers into 
Japan and other industrial countries between 1961 and 1979.  During this period, as a proportion of 
GDP, Japanese imports rose by 66 percent.  This compares with a threefold increase in the 
corresponding U.S. imports, more than tripling of the U.K. imports and a nearly 250 percent growth in 
the imports of other European Economic Community countries.  In 1979, manufactured imports 
constituted only 2.4 percent of the  Japanese GDP; the corresponding proportion in Britain and other 
countries of the EEC was five to six times larger.  Even in the United States which traditionally, 
because of its continental size, has a relatively closed economy, the volume of imported manufacturing 
goods in the late 1970s was proportionally almost twice as large as in Japan.  Clearly, during the 1960s 
and 1970s (and even more so in the 1950s) the Japanese economy operated under a regime of draconian 
import controls, whether practised formally or informally. 
Table 2.  Import-Penetration in Manufactures in Advanced Industrial Countries, 1961-1979 
(ratio of manufactured imports to GNP) 
{PRIVATE }  1961  1965  1969  1973  1979 
U.S.A. 1.5 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.5 
U.K. 4.6 6.7 8.0 11.7 14.2 
Rest of EEC 9 6.1 7.6 10.1 13.0 15.8 
Japan 1.8 1.5 2.2 3.0 2.4 
   Source:  CEPG (1979). 
 
 
 
 
Thus, despite the strong export orientation of the Japanese economy, it was far from being open or 
closely integrated with the world economy. The stories of Taiwan and South Korea, subject to certain 
modifications, also point in the same general direction.[see further Amsden (1989) amd Wade (1990)]. 
 
6.2  Protection and Export Promotion: Alternative Interpretations 
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What was the role of this high degree of protection in the East Asian economies? The East Asian 
Miracle acknowledges the facts of this protective regime but essentially argue that this was generally a 
negative influence which was kept in bounds only by the government pursuit of export targets and 
export contests.( p.18).  
 
However, as noted earlier, Bank economists fail to see, first, that generalised protection was one of the 
mechanisms used by the Japanese and the Korean governments to alleviate the balance of payments 
constraint. Secondly, and equally significantly, there is little recognition of the fact that protection 
played a very important, positive role in promoting technical change, productivity growth and exports 
in these countries. To appreciate how the policy of protection worked at a microeconomic level, 
consider the specific case of the celebrated Japanese car industry.  Magaziner and Hout (1980) point 
out that "government intervention in this industry was characterized by three major goals:  
discouragement of foreign capital in the Japanese industry and protection against car imports, attempts 
to bring about rationalization of production, and assistance with overseas marketing and distribution 
expenditure" (p. 55). The government imposed comprehensive import controls and adopted a variety of 
measures to discourage foreign investment in the car industry.  Quotas and tariffs were used to protect 
the industry; the former were applied throughout the mid-1960s, and prohibitively high tariffs till the 
mid-1970s.  Moreover, "the government controlled all foreign licensing agreements.  To make 
technology agreements more attractive to the licensor, it guaranteed the remittance of royalties from 
Japan.  The policy stipulated, however, that continued remittances would be guaranteed only if 90 
percent of the licensed parts were produced in Japan within five years"--about as powerful a domestic 
content arrangement as one can get. 
 
Just as importantly, protection provided the Japanese companies with a captive home market leading to 
high profits which enabled the firms to undertake higher rates of investment, to learn by doing and to 
improve the quality of their products.  These profits in the protected internal market, which were 
further enhanced by  restrictions on domestic competition (see Section 7), not only made possible 
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higher rates of investment (see Section 9), but also greatly aided exports.  Yamamura (1988) explains 
the mechanism involved: 
Because increased output meant reduced cost per unit it translated into increased profits on the product 
sold at high fixed prices in the domestic market, even if the increased output had to be exported at no 
profit or even at a loss. . . .  Manufacturers enjoyed a margin of error when making . . . major 
investment decisions.  Essentially, even in the face of the high probability that the increase in output 
would have to be sold unprofitably on the international market the expansion was still worth the risk.  
The stronger the "home market cushion"─or the more effective the cartels and protection on the 
domestic arena─the smaller the risk and more likely the Japanese competitor was to increase capacity 
boldly in anticipation of demand growth.  This can give the firm a strategic as well as a cost advantage 
over a foreign competitor operating in a different environment who must be more cautious (page 177). 
6.3  Foreign Direct Investment 
An important feature of both, the Japanese and the Korean governments' industrial policy has been the 
discouragement of the foreign direct investment. Available statistics indicate that among the developing 
countries Korea was second only to India in its low reliance on FDI inflows.  Foreign capital stocks 
totalled just 2.3 per cent of GNP in 1987 in Korea, above the 0.5 per cent estimate for India, but far 
below the levels of 5.3 per cent for Tawain, 17 per cent for Hong Kong, a massive 87 per cent for 
Singapore, 10 per cent for Brazil and 14 per cent for Mexico. UN (1993). In the view of the World Bank 
economists, this discouragement was a self-imposed handicap which was compensated for by the fact 
that both countries remained open to foreign technology through licensing and other means. [East Asian 
Miracle, p.21]. The Bank economists do not ask the question that if the Japanese and the Korean 
governments were as efficient and flexible in their economic policy as they themselves suggest (to 
account for their long term overall economic success), how come they have persisted with this 
apparently wrong-headed approach for so long?  
 
An alternative interpretation is that the approach was perhaps not so wrong-headed. It was 'functional' 
within the context of the overall industrial policies which the two countries were pursuing. First, it 
would have been difficult for MITI or for the Korean authorities to use 'administrative guidance' to the 
same degree with the foreign firms as they were able to do with the domestic ones.  Secondly, as 
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UN(1993) rightly emphasises, there is a link between the national ownership of the large Korean firms 
(Chaebols) and their levels of investment in research and development. Korea has, in relative terms, by 
far the largest expenditure on R and D among developing countries:  1.9 per cent of GNP in 1988, 
compared with 1.2 per cent in Tawain (1988), 0.9 per cent for India (1986) and Singapore (1987), 0.5 
per cent for Argentina (1988), 0.6 per cent in Mexico (1984) and 0.4 per cent in Brazil (1985).  The 
country's performance in this area outstrips that of many developed countries - for example Belgium 
(1.7 per cent in 1987), Denmark (1.5 per cent in 1987), Italy (1.2 per cent in 1987).  It is of course still 
below that of industrial super powers, Japan (2.8 per cent in 1987) and Germany (also 2.8 per cent in 
1987).    
 
Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stresses another important advantage of the policy of mainly rejecting foreign 
investment as a means of technology transfer. This, he argues, automatically places on the enterprise, 
the full responsibility for assimilating imported technology. This is far more likely to lead to total 
system improvements than the 'turn-key plant' mode of import or the foreign subsidiary mode. 
   
6.4  Price Distortions 
 
A quantitive measure of openness used in the East Asian Miracle in its econometric analyses is the so 
called 'Dollar-Index'- the degree to which the relative domestic prices in the HPAEs differed from 
international relative prices. On that measure, it turns out that both Japan and Korea (as well as Taiwan) 
were among the least open of the economies. Relative prices in these countries were more distorted than 
in countries such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Venezuela.
16
 Most of the latter countries are 
often held up by the Bretton Woods institutions as prime examples of countries which do not 'get the 
prices right'. 
 
                                                 
    
16
 This important fact is noted by the East Asian Miracle (p. 301) but its significance is not appreciated. 
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It is also relevant to note in this context that the Japanese Government maintained exchange controls 
and kept a steady nominal exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar over almost the whole of the 
period of that country's most rapid growth (1950-73).  Purchasing power parity calculations by Sachs 
(1987), using Japanese and U.S. price indices, show a 60 percent real appreciation of the exchange rate 
between 1950 and 1970. 
 
6.5  The Optimal Degree of Openness and Strategic Integration with the World Economy 
 
To sum up, the experience of Japan and Korea comprehensively contradicts the central theses of many 
World Bank Reports that, the more open the economy, the closer its integration with the global 
economy, the faster would be its rate of growth. During their periods of rapid growth, instead of a deep 
or unconditional integration with the world economy, these countries evidently sought what might be 
called 'strategic' integration, i.e. they integrated upto the point that it was in their interest to do so as to 
promote national economic growth.  If (as stated in the Development Challenge), the purpose of the 
Bank economists was to find out why countries like Japan have been so successful in economic 
development during the last forty years, they have clearly been using the wrong paradigm for examining 
Japanese economic history.  The basic problem is that the underlying assumptions of this paradigm are 
greatly at variance with the real world of static and dynamic economies of scale, learning by doing, and 
imperfect competition.  In such a world, even neoclassical analysis now accepts that the optimal degree 
of openness for a country is not "close" integration with the global economy through free trade.
17
  In 
that case, what is the optimal degree of openness for the economy?  This extremely important policy 
question however is not seriously addressed by the orthodox theory.
18
 
 
Chakravarty and Singh (1988) provide an alternative theoretical perspective for considering this issue. 
                                                 
    
17
See for example Krugman (1987) and Rodrick (1992). 
    
18
On this point, see the interesting review by Lucas (1990) of Helpman & Krugman (1989). 
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To put it briefly, they argue that "openness" is a multi-dimensional concept; apart from trade, a country 
can be "open" or not so open with respect to financial and capital markets, in relation to technology, 
science, culture, education, inward and outward migration.  Moreover a country can choose to be open 
in some directions [say trade] but not so open in others such as foreign direct investment or financial 
markets. Their analysis suggests that there is no unique optimum form or degree of openness which 
holds true for all countries at all times.  A number of factors affect the desirable nature of openness:  
the world configuration, the past history of the economy, its state of development, among others.  The 
timing and sequence of opening are also critical.  They point out that there may be serious irreversible 
losses if the wrong kind of openness is attempted or the timing and sequence are incorrect.  The East 
Asian experience of "strategic" rather than "close" integration with the world economy is fully 
comprehensible within this kind of theoretical framework. 
It is also useful to consider the experience of the second tier of South East Asian NICs - Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia - within such a framework.  As noted earlier, in the South-East Asian economies, 
foreign direct investment has played a far more important role than it did in Japan or South Korea. One 
interpretation of this phenomenon is that as a consequence of the fast development of the East Asian 
countries, the second tier NICs are faced with a different historical situation, which makes the optimal 
degree of openness defferent for these countries. In this new situation it is advantageous for the south 
east Asian NICs to attract industries which are no longer economic in the first tier countries because of 
the growth of their real wages - as suggested by the so called "flying geese" model of Asian economic 
development. 
 
It may be observed that this model and the associated intra-regional pattern of trade and investment in 
Asia can itself be regarded as in part a product of the industrial policy in Japan, Korea and other 
countries.  Unlike many other advanced countries which try to protect declining industries, the 
Japanese practice a 'positive' industrial policy of encouraging structural change by assisting the 
replacement of old industries by the new.  This, however, involves an orderly rundown of the older 
industries (see next section), including inter-alia their transfer to less developed countries in the 
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region.(Okimoto, 1989) 
 
Consequently, Felix (1994) suggests that East Asian foreign direct investment in the region has been 
structurally more conducive to sustaining backward linkage development in the participant economies 
than has been the case of foreign direct investment in Latin America. He ascribes this to the fact that the 
East Asian intra-regional pattern has evolved along a dynamic comparative advantage path dominated 
by cost minimising trade and investment. The Latin American pattern, he suggests, has been shaped 
largely by mercantilist market access rather than by cost minimising objectives. As a result, it is more 
vulnerable to disruptive shifts of trading advantages deriving from changes in the marketing and 
financial strategies of foreign firms. At this stage, the above interpretation of the south east Asian NICs' 
high propensity to seek foreign investment in terms of the changing optimal degree of openness can 
only be regarded as a suggestive hypothesis. An alternative interpretation will of course be that the 
second tier NICs do not really absorb FDI in the context of a national or regional industrial policy but 
simply welcome it as it arrives. It may also be the case that notwithstanding Felix's analysis, there is no 
great difference between U.S. FDI in Latin America and Japanese FDI in south east Asia. It may well be 
the case that Japanese FDI in south east Asia is no more inherently conducive to development than U.S. 
FDI in Latin America. This is an important subject for systematic empirical research. 
 
7.  COMPETITION IN THE DOMESTIC MARKETS 
 
Many Bank Reports stressed the virtues of "free mobility of capital and labor" and "free entry and exit 
of firms" and the importance of competition in the domestic markets. However, the  practice of the 
successful East Asian countries in this respect also has been rather different.  As in relation to the 
question of integration with the world economy, Japan and Korea appear to have taken the view that 
from the dynamic perspective of promoting investment and technical change, the optimal degree of 
competition is not perfect or maximum competition.  The governments in these countries have 
therefore managed or guided competition in a purposeful manner:  it has both been encouraged, but 
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notably also restricted in a number of ways. 
 
7.1  Collusion and Competition in Japan 
 
In Japan, in the years immediately following the war, the Zaibaitsu were disbanded, and anti-trust laws 
of the U.S. type were enacted under the tutelage of the occupation authorities. However, over time these 
pro-competition measures were greatly diluted.  During the period of Japan's fast growth, the 
government permitted or encouraged a variety of cartel arrangements in a wide range of 
industries--export and import cartels, cartels to combat depression or excessive competition, 
rationalization cartels, etc.  Table 3 provides information on cartels which were exempted during the 
period 1964 to 1973 from Japan's anti-monopoly laws.  According to Caves and Ukeusa (1976), cartels 
accounted for 78.1 percent of the value of shipments in textiles; 64.8 percent in clothing; 50.0 percent in 
non-ferrous metals; 47 percent in printing and publishing; 41.2 percent in stone, clay and glass; 34.5 
percent in steel products, and 37.2 percent in food products.  
Although these cartels functioned for only limited periods of time and there was wide variation in their 
effectiveness,  Caves and Uekusa observed that "their mere presence in such broad stretches of the 
manufacturing sector attests to their importance." (page 147). 
 
However, these restraints on competition were only a part of the story. An equally significant part was 
MITI's strong encouragement of vigorous domestic oligopolistic rivalry and international 
competitiveness. In general, whether competition was promoted or restricted depended on the industry 
and its life-cycle: in young industries, during the developmental phase, the government discouraged 
competition; when these industries became technologically mature, competition was allowed to 
flourish.  Later, when industries are in competitive decline, the government again discourages 
competition and, as noted earlier, attempts to bring about an orderly rationalization of the industry 
(Okimoto, 1989).   
 
Table 3.  Japanese Cartel Agreements Exempted from Antimonopoly Law by Fair Trade Commission or 
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Competent Ministry, by Exempting Statute, 1964-73
a
 
{PRIVATE 
}Statutory basis 
for exemption 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Depression cartels 2 2 16 1 0 0 0 0 9 2 
Rationalization 
cartels 
14 14 14 13 13 12 10 13 10 10 
Export cartels 201 208 211 206 213 217 214 192 175 180 
Import cartels 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 
Cartels under 
Medium and Small 
Enterprises 
Organization Act 
 
 
588 
 
 
587 
 
 
652 
 
 
634 
 
 
582 
 
 
522 
 
 
469 
 
 
439 
 
 
604 
 
 
607 
Cartels under 
Environment 
Sanitation Act 
 
106 
 
122 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
Cartels under 
Coastal Shipping 
Association Act 
 
15 
 
14 
 
16 
 
15 
 
22 
 
22 
 
22 
 
21 
 
19 
 
19 
Cartels under other 
statues 
43 50 44 44 47 48 56 53 34 42 
Total 970 999 1,079 1,040 1,003 948 898 844 976 985 
Source:  Japanese Fair Trade Commission, Staff Office, The Antimonopoly Act of Japan (1973), p. 27.   
Reproduced from Caves & Uekusa (1976), p. 158. 
 
a
Number in force in March of each year. 
 
 
Students of Japanese economy provide many examples of the above pattern from a number of different 
industries.  In steel, for example, Scott (1991) observes that during the expansion phase of the industry, 
individual companies were not allowed to build new plants except at world class scale.  This meant 
"spacing out investments to build large-scale plants without at the same time generating an excess 
capacity.  Japanese firms were required to wait their turn to build a new plant while a competitor built 
new capacity and achieved high volumes.  Next time the roles will be reversed.  This kind of 
coordination was carried out under the aegis of the  government─by MITI.  Later the system required 
the scrapping of old capacity as a condition for permission to build new.  As a result Japan with a 
smaller home market than the U.S. built ten plants larger than any in the U.S." (p. 54) 
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 Yamamura (1988) provides a useful model of Japanese industrial policy and the role of 
competition within it.  The government essentially organized an "investment race" among large 
oligopolistic firms in which exports and world market share were significant performance goals.  As in 
the real world markets are always incomplete, such a race without a coordinator may lead to ruinous 
competition, price wars and excess capacity, inhibiting the inducement to invest.  In the Japanese 
economic miracle, MITI provided this crucial coordinating role (with the help of industry associations) 
and orchestrated the dynamic combination of collusion and competition which characterizes Japanese 
industrial policy.  "In a nutshell," Yamamura observes "what MITI did was to `guide' the firms to 
invest in such a way that each large firm in a market expanded its productive capacity roughly in 
proportion to its current market share─no firm was to make an investment so large that it would 
destabilize the market.  The policy was effective in encouraging competition for the market share (thus 
preserving the essential competitiveness of the industrial markets) while reducing the risk of losses due 
to excessive investment.  Thus it promoted the aggressive expansion of capacity necessary to increase 
productive efficiency in output" (p. 175). 
 
7.2  Large Firms and Domestic Competition in Korea 
 
Turning to Korea, that country also did not follow a policy of maximum domestic competition or 
unfettered market-determined entry or exit of firms. The Korean government, if anything, went one step 
further than the Japanese in actively helping to create large conglomerates, promoting mergers, and 
directing entry and exit of firms according to the requirements of technological scale economies and 
world demand conditions. The result is that Korea's manufacturing industry displays one of the highest 
levels of market concentration anywhere - whether among the developing or the developed countries. 
The top 50 chaebols accounted for 15 per cent of the country's GDP in 1990. Among the largest 500 
industrial companies in the world in 1990, there were eleven Korean firms, the same number as 
Switzerland. UN(1993) observes in relation to the Korean industrial structure:  
"Such a structure is the deliberate creation of the Government, which utilised a highly interventionist 
strategy to push industry into large-scale, complex technologically demanding activities while 
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simultaneously restricting FDI inflows tightly to promote national ownership. It was deemed 
necessary to create enterprises of large size and diversity, to undertake the risk inherent in 
launching in high-technology, high-skill activities that would remain competitive in world 
markets. The chaebol acted as the representative and spearheads of the Government's strategy: 
they were supported by protection against imports and TNC entry, subsidised credit, 
procurement preference and massive investments in education, infrastructure and 
science-technology network".   
 
 
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the big business groups still exhibited highly rivalrous 
behaviour (Kim, 1992). This was because under rapid growth conditions, as well as the rules of the 
game which the state had established, there was neither the incentive nor the ability for big business to 
collude.  The Korean government went out of its way to ensure that big business did not collude, by 
allocating subsidies only in exchange for strict performance standards (Amsden, 1989).  After 1975 
inter-group competition in Korea became even more fierce as each chaebol, or diversified business 
group, tried to qualify for generous subsidies to establish a general trading company by meeting 
government performance standards regarding minimum export volume and number of export products 
(Cho, 1987).
19
 
 
7.3  Capital Markets 
 
Turning briefly to the capital markets, as in the case of the product markets, the East Asian Miracle 
distances itself from the Development Challenge with respect to the virtues of a freely functioning 
capital market.  It recognises that capital markets are particularly subject to information imperfections 
and  
 
Table 4.  Percent Distribution of Manufacturing Value-Added
a
 by Firm Size, Selected 
Countries, 1973 
                                                 
    
19
 It is argued in the East Asian Miracle that small and medium sized firms and competitive forces have 
played a greater role in Taiwan's economy than in South Korea. That may well be true but it is interesting 
to observe that Taiwan's industrial structure, nevertheless, displayed a high degree of concentration. See 
table 4. 
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{PRIVATE }Number of Workers 
Country  1-9  10-99  100-499  500 or more 
Korea 5.8 13.8 27.7 52.7 
Taiwan
b
 4.4 16.7 22.5 56.4 
Hong Kong 7.4 30.2 32.1 30.2 
Brazil 3.4 23.7 36.1 36.6 
Turkey
c
 11.7 10.1 27.5 48.4 
Peru 4.0 23.9 46.4 25.7 
Japan
d
 8.7 28.4 24.9 37.9 
Canada
d
 2.0 21.1 37.4 39.3 
Czechoslovakia 0.2 5.4 18.2 76.11 
Austria 0.8 21.5 36.2 41.5 
United Kingdom 15.7
e
 24.4 60.0 
United States
d
 2.4 18.3 30.5 48.7 
Source:  All countries except Taiwan:  United Nations (1979).  Taiwan:  Executive Yuan, The 
Report of Industrial and Commercial Census of Taiwan and Fukien, District of the Republic of China, 
1971, quoted in S. Ho (1980).  Reproduced from Amsden (1989). 
a
Generally, value-added in producers' values. 
b
Value-added in factor values, 1971. 
c
1970. 
d
Net 
value-added in factor values.
e
1-99. 
co-ordination failures, and that there is therefore a sound analytical foundation for appropriate 
government action to address such failures through for example subsidised credit, or through 
socialisation of risk by government guarantees of specific investments. 
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Indeed, in none of the exemplar East Asian countries did a competitive capital market play a significant 
role in financing industrial growth.  The banks in South Korea were state owned until the early 1980s.  
Although some of them are now under majority private ownership, the state has an enormous influence 
and control over their activities.  Taiwan's leading banks continue to be under state ownership even 
today.  The Japanese financial system, during the period of the economic miracle (1950-73), although 
not under state ownership, was bank-based, oligopolistic and subject to considerable state direction.
  
 
Similarly, with respect to the stockmarket, a growing number of scholars in the U.S. and the U.K. today 
believe that the Japanese economic success is also in part due to the fact that the industrial corporations 
in that country have been spared, unlike their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the tender mercies of a stock 
market and a freely functioning market for corporate control (see Dore, 1985; Odagiri and Hase, 1989; 
Cosh, Hughes, and Singh, 1990).  There are good analytical reasons for the view that the 
stock-market-based competitive financial systems may lead to "short-termism" and may not therefore 
be conducive to promoting industrial investment, technical progress and productivity growth.
20
   
 
 
7.4 An Assessment 
 
 
At one level, the Miracle Study marks a major advance in the Bank's thinking about the relative roles of 
competition and cooperation in economic development.  Implicitly rejecting the view embodied in 
many previous Bank documents and specifically in the Development Challenge that, "Competitive 
markets are the best way yet found for efficiently organising the production and distribution of goods 
and services", it accepts the argument that the optimal degree of competition from the perspective of 
dynamic efficiency (i.e. for maximising the long term rate of growth in productivity) is not maximum 
                                                 
    
20
There is a large literature on the subject.  For the U.K., see Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1990), Singh 
(1992c).  For the U.S. see for example, MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity [Dertouzos et. al. 
1989] and Porter (1992). For an opposite perspective on the question of the stockmarket and 
short-termism, see Marsh (1992).  
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competition.  More importantly, both at a theoretical level and empirically in relation to Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, it accepts the case for cooperation (or restrictions on competition) in order to correct 
what it calls, the coordination failures, which particularly characterise industrialising country markets.  
In this analysis, a much larger role of the government as a referee to mediate these cooperative 
arrangements is explicitly recognised.  The theoretical as well as the empirical conclusion of the East 
Asian Miracle is unequivocal: that a policy regime with the right combination of competition and 
cooperation, of the kind successfully implemented in the East Asian countries, is superior to that of 
competition alone.  Thus, intellectually, the study accepts the revisionist argument that the 
governments in these East Asian countries guided the market and the competitive process and that this 
guidance was conducive to their fast growth.  
 
Nevertheless, after this giant conceptual step forward, in its policy recommendations to other 
developing countries, the East Asian Miracle  retraces that step and comes back full circle to the 
position of free and flexible markets and competition alone as prescribed in the earlier Bank documents.  
The central argument that is made here is that  other countries do not have the institutional capacity to 
successfully implement such an amalgam of competition and cooperation despite the latter's theoretical 
attraction and its evident success in East Asia. This argument will be examined in the concluding 
section. 
 
There are, however, other important aspects of the nature of domestic competition which are neglected 
in the East Asian Miracle but which deserve comment.  Firstly, Bank economists applaud the 
"vigorous competition" which has existed in the Japanese and Korean domestic product markets 
without fully appreciating that this was largely oligopolistic competition among the giants rather than 
the price competition of the text-book variety.  The former tends to be non-price 'strategic' competition 
which does not necessarily have the welfare properties ascribed to a competitive economy in 
conventional theory. Although this kind of Schumpetrian market structure is often conducive to 
technological change, it can also lead to social waste, and the loss of consumer welfare. To avoid the 
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latter and to exploit its full potential for technological development, this kind of market structure very 
much requires the visible hand of the government to regulate its operations. 
 
Secondly, the underlying causal model of competition in the East Asian Miracle is still one in which 
competition or non-market competitive contests are required for economic growth.  However, as 
demonstrated in Amsden and Singh (1994), in Japan and Korea, it was growth which led to increased 
competition and reduced industrial concentration rather than the other way round.  Paradoxically, 
without the government restrictions on competition and monitoring of investment races, such high 
investment and growth rates may not have materialized in the first place. 
 
Despite the major intellectual advances with respect to the role of competition and cooperation in the 
product markets and that of socialisation of risks in the financial markets,
21
 the discussion of labour 
markets in the East Asian Miracle is disappointing.  Here, the study falls back on labour market 
flexibility as the characteristic feature of these economies which allowed them to achieve efficient 
allocation of their human capital and hence fast economic growth.  It is implicitly acknowledged that 
the causation here could be the other way around, i.e. that fast economic growth made possible the 
labour market flexibility since as the study itself notes, "rapid growth was a key factor in making the 
wages more flexible in the HPAEs". (p.269). The authors of the East Asian Miracle do not however tell 
us that even though wages grew rapidly, productivity growth was even faster. Nor do they comment on 
the role of political repression (constraints on trade union activity, etc.) in many of these countries for 
much of the relevant period in ensuring this outcome.
22
 
 
However, World Bank economists have overlooked the fact that, like physical capital formation, human 
capital formation is equally subject to extensive coordination failures.  This is particularly so in a 
                                                 
    
21
 In these chapters of the Report, the healthy influence of Professor Stiglitz, one of the consultants to 
the Report, is very much in evidence. 
    
22
. For a discussion of these issues with respect to Korea, see You and Chang          [1993]. 
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fast-growing developing economy undergoing huge structural changes.  It becomes necessary for the 
government to intervene to ensure that a labour force with the required  skills and training is available 
to meet the needs of the growing economy. Contrary to the East Asian Miracle,  evidence suggests that 
that is exactly what the state in a country like Korea did do. It intervened heavily in the labour markets, 
not just to maintain industrial peace, but also to ensure that the growth process is not thwarted by the 
lack of skills and training. [You and Chang (1993).  See also Section 11 below]. 
    
Similarly, the East Asian Miracle does not appreciate the fact that as in the case of the product and 
financial markets, some "rigidities" in the labour market may also be functional and dynamically 
efficient.  Thus in Japan a significant part of the labour force has effectively a life-time security of 
employment, and seniority is an important determinant of workers' wages in these large firms. Many 
leading scholars of the Japanese economy ascribe the international competitive success and technical 
leadership of the Japanese corporations precisely to these "rigidities" in the labour market. Security of 
employment encourages workers to undertake firm specific investments in human capital, to promote 
technical change rather than to thwart it (for the fear of being made redundant).  Not least, it also lets 
workers identify their interest with those of the corporation (see further Aoki, 1990; Dore, 1986, among 
others).   
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8. WHY DID THE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES NOT HAVE A DEBT CRISIS IN THE 1980S 
 
If the Development Challenge had been written in 1981 rather than in 1991, it would certainly have 
included one important Latin American country namely Brazil, and probably also Mexico and 
Columbia as outstanding examples of successful economic development.  Between 1965 and 1980, 
Brazil was a "miracle" economy, recording a growth rate of 9 per cent per annum - almost equal to that 
of Taiwan or South Korea during this period.  Similarly, the Mexican economy expanded at a rate of 
nearly 6 per cent per annum over the three decades 1950-80, which would also put that country among 
the top performers in the league tables of economic growth for that long time span.  Yet both Mexico 
and Brazil stumbled badly during the 1980s whilst Korea and other East Asian, as well as South Asian 
countries were able to maintain, or even to improve upon their previous pace of economic expansion. 
The main reason for this was that Brazil and other Latin American countries had a debt crises in the 
1980s which Korea and most other Asian countries did not. This raises the crucial question: why did a 
country like Brazil have a debt crisis in the 1980s whilst Korea did not?   
 
8.1 The Great Continental Divide 
 
This question is one of a number of analytical, empirical and policy issues currently under debate.  At 
the empirical level, an outstanding feature of the world economy during the decade of the 1980s was 
what Singh (1986b) called the  "great continental divide": the striking differences in economic 
performance of the three developing continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America. During this decade, 
economic growth collapsed in Latin America and Africa while it continued at much the same rate, if not 
faster than before in most Asian countries (not just Korea and high performing East Asian countries, but 
also South Asian countries like India). [See Table 5].  What is remarkable about the development 
experience of this decade is not only the very large inter-continental differences which emerged in this 
period but rather the intra-continental uniformity of experience.  
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The comparison between Asian and Latin American countries is especially significant in this context. 
Tables 6-8 provide more detailed comparative information for a sample of nine Asian and nine Latin 
American countries. Table 6 highlights the intra-continental uniformity of economic experience of the 
two groups of countries during the 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the median growth rates of the two 
groups were much the same. However in the 1980s none of the Asian countries except Phillipines 
recorded a growth rate of less than 4 per cent.  In sharp contrast no Latin American country managed to 
grow at 4 per cent during that decade - only two of them (Columbia and Chile) achieved a growth rate of 
more than 3 per cent.   
 
This intra-continental uniformity of economic experience is particularly surprising for the Asian 
countries since these countries not only have followed rather different economic policy regimes but also 
have very different political systems. The Asian sample contains communist countries like China as 
well as democratic regimes like India and authoritarian governments like Indonesia.  Among the 
capitalist countries, Korea has followed  a rather different economic policy regime (it has been export 
oriented) than India's (the country has been a prime example of inward orientation).  Yet all these 
countries managed to 
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 Table 5 
Growth Performance in the Developing Countries by Category (a) and Region (b) 1965-80 and 
1980-90 
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP % 
                1965-80 1980-90 
Low income economies   4.9   6.1 
China     6.8   9.5 
India      3.6   5.3 
Other low income    4.8   3.9 
Middle income economies   6.3   2.5 
______________________________________________________________ 
Sub-Saharan Africa   4.2   2.1 
East Asia and Pacific   7.3   7.8 
South Asia     3.6   5.2 
Latin America and Carribean  6.0   1.6 
______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
(a) The World Bank defines "low income countries" as those with per capita income of $ 580 or less in 
1989. 
Middle income countries are defined as those with income per capita of more than $ 580 and less than $ 
6000. 
 
(b) For the lists of countries included in each region, see the source listed below. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1992. 
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  Table 6 
 GDP Growth rate in Asia and Latin American countries (% per year) 
 
 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
                                                               
    1960-70 1970-80 1980-90                                                               
                                                               
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────      
Asia 
  China   5.2   5.8   9.5    
  India   3.4   3.6   5.3 
  Indonesia   3.9   7.6   5.5 
  Korea   8.6   9.5   9.7 
  Malaysia   6.5   7.8   5.2 
  Pakistan   6.7   4.7   6.3 
  Philippines  5.1   6.3   0.9  
  Sri Lanka   4.6   4.1   4.0 
  Taiwan   ...    ...   ... 
  Thailand   8.4   7.2   7.6          
 
   
Median   5.2   6.3   5.3 
 
Latin America 
  Argentina   4.2   2.2       -0.4 
  Bolivia   5.2   4.8       -0.1 
  Brazil   5.4   8.4   2.7 
  Chile   4.5   2.8   3.2  
  Colombia   5.1   5.9   3.7 
  Ecuador   ...   8.8   2.0 
  Mexico   7.2   5.2   1.0 
  Peru   4.9   3.0       -0.3 
  Venezuela   6.0   5.0   1.0 
 
Median   5.1   5.0   1.0 
 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
Source:  World Bank 1982, 1989 
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 Table 7  
 
Rates of inflation in Asia and Latin America, 1960-1990 (average annual percentage growth 
of consumer price index) [a] 
 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────                                                         
     1960-70 1970-80 1980-90                                                               
                                                               
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 
Asia 
  China ...   ... 5.8         India
 7.1  8.5  7.9         
Indonesia ...  20.5  8.4 
  Korea 17.4  19.8  5.1 
  Malaysia -0.3  7.5  1.6 
  Pakistan 3.3  13.5  6.7         
Philippines 5.8  13.2  14.9  
  Sri Lanka 1.8  12.6  11.0 
  Taiwan 3.5  12.2    
  Thailand 1.8  9.9  3.3          
Median 3.4  12.6  6.7 
 
 
Latin America 
  Argentina 21.7  130.8  395.1 
  Bolivia 3.5  22.3  318.2 
  Brazil 46.1  36.7  284.4 
  Chile 33.2  185.6  20.5  
  Colombia 11.9  22.0  24.8 
  Ecuador ...  14.4  36.7 
  Mexico 3.6  19.3  70.4 
  Peru 10.4  30.7  233.7 
  Venezuela 1.3  12.1  19.3 
 
Median 11.1  22.3  70.4 
 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
[a] GDP deflator for 1980-90 
 
Source:  World Bank (1982, 1992) 
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Table 8: Current account balance in Asian and Latin American countries, 1965-1985 (current 
account balance/GNP, %) 
 
{PRIVATE } 1965-73 1973-80 1980-89 
Asia    
China ... ... ... 
India -0.5 -0.3 -2.4 
Indonesia -2.2 0.1 -2.8 
Korea -3.6 -5.3 1.6 
Malaysia -0.7 0.6 -2.9 
Pakistan ... -5.6 -4.0 
Philippines 0.0 -4.8 -4.1 
Sri Lanka -1.2 -7.2 -10.2 
Thailand -1.1 -5.1 -4.1 
Median -1.1 -5.1  
Latin America    
Argentina 0.0 -0.6 -4.3 
Bolivia -0.2 -6.7 -10.2 
Brazil -1.7 -4.5 -1.8 
Chile -1.4 -5.2 -3.0 
Colombia -1.8 0.4 -10.3 
Equador -2.7 -5.5 -4.2 
Mexico -1.5 -3.9 -1.8 
Peru -0.5 -4.1 -4.2 
Venezuela 0.7 1.9 1.6 
Median -1.5 -4.1  
Source: World Bank, 1991. 
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either maintain or to improve upon their economic performance in the 1980s, whilst the Latin 
American countries were aflicted with collective economic failure.    
 
8.2  Competing Explanatory Hypotheses 
 
How can then we explain the almost universal success of Asian countries and the similarly 
universal failure of the Latin American countries during the post-1980 period. This issue is a 
subject of a major debate in the literature.23  
A central thesis of the Development Challenge is that domestic policy matters far more than 
international conditions in determining a country's economic performance.  Thus Bank as well 
as other orthodox economists argue that these remarkable inter-continental performance 
differences  are not due to external shocks, which in any case both groups of countries were 
subject to.  Rather these arose from the short and long-term policy choices which were made.  
The East Asian success and Latin American failure is attributed to the greater openness of the 
former group of economies to international trade and financial flows, and the relatively closed 
nature of the Latin American countries.  Moreover, it is argued that the latter group followed 
inappropriate macro-economic policies, particularly the exchange-rate policies. East Asian 
countries are also supposed to have invested their foreign borrowings in export oriented 
industries which allowed them to service their debts. In Latin America, on the other hand, it is 
suggested that the state had much too pervasive a role. This led to rent-seeking, corruption and 
economic mis-management. It also resulted in these countries using their foreign resources for 
wasteful current consumption and inefficient investments in long gestation lag, import 
substitution projects.  
 
                                                 
    
23
 For the BWI and orthodox analyses, see among others the Development Challenge, Summers and 
Thomas (1993), Sachs(1985), Balassa et al(1986), Maddison(1985).  The heterodox views on the subject 
are expressed in Fishlow(1991), Hughes and Singh(1991), Banuri(1991), Singh(1986b,1993b). 
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The heterodox view on these intercontinental differences in economic performance varies 
greatly from the above catalogue of East Asian virtues and Latin American sins. The heterodox 
economists point out, first of all, that it is not just the East Asian NICs which did well in the 
1980s, but as seen earlier, so did a whole range of other Asian countries, including the South 
East Asian as well as the previous lagards in the region, the South Asian economies (e.g. India).  
Secondly they point to the fact that this continent-wide economic success in Asia occurred 
despite very considerable diversity in the (a) economic policy regimes, (b) political systems and 
(c) governance capacities of these countries.  
 
However, the main heterodox argument is that world economic slow-down at the end of the 
1970s and the early 1980s had a markedly different impact on the two regions. The Asian 
success and the Latin American failure in the last decade is attributed to the fact that at the 
beginning of the decade, the latter group of countries were subject to much more severe 
external shocks than the former. These large shocks to the Latin American economies were 
compounded by further external shocks during the rest of the decade, all of which resulted in 
the observed prolonged economic decline in these countries. The Asian economies, on the 
other hand, 'succeeded' because they were able to adjust quickly to the relatively less severe 
external shocks which they experienced at the beginning of the decade. They were also not 
subject to further shocks of the same magnitude as the Latin American and the Sub-Saharan 
countries suffered during the rest of the 1980s.  
 
8.3 Evidence 
 
1. The external shocks of the early 1980s: In 1979, in the wake of the second oil price increase 
and domestic inflation, the US Federal Reserve began to implement a new kind of monetary 
policy. This was based on the monetarist doctrine and it involved targetting particular money 
supply aggregates. The policy was deeply contractionary and it resulted in a quantum jump in 
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interest rates (the so-called Volcker shock) - real interest rose fourteen fold in the early 1980s 
compared with the mid-seventies. The US policies were soon immitated by other industrial 
countries which resulted in a long recession in these economies. (Singh, 1986a). The effect of 
these changes in the international economic environment on the developing countries was 
devastating. Sachs(1985) and Balassa(1984) suggest that the Asian and the Latin American 
countries were equally affected by these world economic changes. 
 
The evidence, however, does not bear out this thesis. Developing countries during this period 
were subject to four different kinds of external shocks: a demand shock, a terms of trade shock, 
an interest rate shock and a capital supply shock. In a world of imperfect wage-price flexibility, 
balance of payments disequilibria, capital rationing and foreign exchange constraints, all four 
shocks are relevant and important.24  Sachs considered only the first two of these shocks. 
Balassa examined the impact of the demand shock as well, but in a limited form. However, 
neither of the two authors considered the capital supply shock whereby following the inability 
of the Mexican government in 1982 to service its debt, the banks suddenly stopped lending to 
all Latim American countries.  
 
However the banks  continued to lend to East Asian economies even though their current 
account deficits as a proportion of GDP were no smaller than those of the heavily indebted 
Latin American countries. As table 7 shows, in the period 1973-80, the median current account 
deficit of the Asian countries was 5.1 per cent. The corresponding figure for the Latin American 
countries was lower, 4.1 per cent. Korea's deficit during this period was 5.3 per cent of GDP, 
compared with 4.5 per cent for Brazil and 3.9 per cent for Mexico. Yet Korea which was as 
heavily indebted as Mexico or Brazil escaped the capital supply shock while the banks stopped 
voluntary lending to the latter two countries, precipitating a huge crisis in their real 
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 See further Dornbusch, 1985. 
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economy.(Barker and Brailovsky,1983). 
 
Perhaps the most important single reason why the Asian countries escaped the debt crisis of 
the last decade was that they were not subject to the capital supply shock. This raises the 
question why did the banks stop lending to Mexico and Brazil while they continued to lend to 
Korea financing its large current account deficits? Larrain and Vergara (1993) suggest that 
Koreans were just lucky.  The two authors note that "in the period 1979-82 the Korean current 
account deficit was, on average, 6.3 per cent of GDP. The budget deficit surpassed 4 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1981 and 1982 (4.7 per cent and 4.4 per cent respectively), 
inflation averaged 18.9 per cent. By 1982 external debt had climbed to more than 50 percent of 
GDP."   
 
Williamson(1985) ascribes the differences in the banks' treatment of Mexico and Brazil on the 
one hand, and of Korea on the other, to a herd-instinct on the part of the banks and to a 
'contagian' effect. He suggests that had Korea been a Latin American country, it would have 
also been subject to the contagion effect and not turned out so lucky. 
 
2. Other factors. 
 
Evidence on other factors which helped the Asian countries to ward off the debt-crisis may be 
summarised as follows. 
a. 'The initial conditions' were more favourable to the Asian countries. Their median 
debt-service ratio was only half as large as that of the Latin American countries at the end of 
the 1970s. Hughes and Singh (1991). 
 
b. The world economic recession at the beginning of the decade had a dissimilar effect on 
export demand for the countries of the two regions. The demand for Asian exports was 
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relatively less affected since despite the world recession, there was a boom in the 
Middle-Eastern markets. More importantly, the Asian countries benefitted greatly through an 
enormous increase in the remittances from the migrants who went to work in the Middle-East. 
 
c. Not only did the world economic slowdown of the early 1980s had a smaller impact on the 
Asian economies (if all the external shocks are considered), the latter also enjoyed much better 
terms of trade than the Latin American and the African countries during the rest of the decade. 
The terms of trade of the South Asian countries and the East Asian NICs either remained the 
same or improved in the 1980s while those of the Latin American countries deteriorated by 
more than 15 per cent and those of Sub-Saharan countries fell by nearly 30 per cent. (Ross, 
1991). Moreover, the Asian countries, unlike the Latin American, did not face the reverse 
capital flows in the middle and the late 1980s. 
 
d. Fishlow (1991) provides detailed evidence to show that foreign borrowings were no more 
used to increase consumption rather than investment by Brazil or Mexico than by Indonesia or 
Korea. He points out that the NICs in both continents used the market opportunity provided 
by the extraordinarily low, indeed, negative interest rates in the mid 1970s to borrow foreign 
funds in order to establish a heavy industrial base to further deepen their industrialisation 
process. This was done as much by Brazil as by Korea. The main reason why,in the event, the 
Korean heavy industry programme succeeded25 while the Brazilian did not was the far more 
severe foreign exchange constraint which Brazil experienced as a consequence of the debt 
crisis.   
 
e. The mainstream theory of 'openness', ie, that the reason the Asian countries were able to 
                                                 
    
25
 As noted in Section 5 the East Asian Miracle regards this programme as a failure. However, it was 
also pointed out there that this assessment was not valid since the HCI investments more than redeemed 
themselves in the 1980s by providing the main basis of the highly successful Korean export drive during 
that decade. 
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avoid the debt-crisis was because their economies were much more open and therefore more 
efficient, is not supported by evidence. First, Hughes and Singh (1991) note that the Asian 
countries were much less open to the international economy, on at least one important 
dimension than their Latin American counterparts. Unlike the latter, most Asian countries 
implemented fairly strict exchange controls, and therefore their financial markets were far less 
open.Secondly, with respect to the question of trade openness, Hughes and Singh observe that 
the least open Asian countries, like China, India, Pakistan, for example, were able to cope as 
effectively with the economic crisis of the 1980s as the more export-oriented economies. 
Moreover, they observe that Mexico's and Argentina's  manufactured exports grew much 
faster than India's in the relevant period, and yet the latter did not have a debt-crisis while the 
former did.   
 
8.4 Assessment 
 
For the reasons detailed above, Bank economist's treatment of the impact of external shocks on 
developing countries is very unsatisfactory.  One unfortunate consequence of this is that they 
are led into a number of other analytical errors by not properly considering the effects of world 
economic conditions for national economic performance.  In view of the significant external 
shocks suffered by Latin American economies in the 1980s, it is not valid to aggregate their 
performance in that period with those of the 1960-1980 period, as it would produce misleading 
results.  Rather different rankings of economic performance of developing countries and 
hence very different conclusions with respect to 'successful' economic policies would emerge if 
the periods 1960-80 and 1980-90 are examined separately rather than together. 
 
9. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES 
 
9.1 The main issues  
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As noted earlier, an outstanding feature of the high performing East Asian economies is their 
high rates of savings and investment.  These countries top the international league tables not 
just in terms of the longterm growth of their gdp, but also with respect to their national 
savings and investment rates. This was, however, not always the case. For example, 
UNCTAD(1994) notes with respect to Japan that gross domestic fixed capital formation in 
that country increased from 24 percent of gnp in the early 1950s to almost 40 percent in the 
1960s.The ratio of private equipment investment to GNP doubled between the early 1950s 
and the late 1960s, reaching 17 percent. Similarly, in Korea, gross domestic fixed investment 
as  a proportion of gdp rose from less than 10 percent in the mid-1950s to about 25 percent in 
the mid-1970s , and to over 30 percent by the mid-1980s.26 In terms of Purchasing Power 
Parity Summers-Heston data, Young (1994) estimates that between 1960 and 1980, gross fixed 
investment to GDP ratio doubled in Taiwan, tripled in Korea And quadrupled in Singapore. 
 
It was seen in Section 3 that an important issue in contention in explaining East Asian 
economic growth is the nature and the extent of the contributions made by these high rates of 
investment. Whether or not the latter were the primary factor in the East Asian miracle (the 
non-neoclassical view), everyone agrees that their contribution was substantial. This raises 
the next important question, how were these high savings and investments rates achieved?  
Specifically, what was the role of the government in this endeavour. The debate also centres 
around the efficay of the particular instruments used by  governments (eg directed or 
subsidised credit) for accomplishing these tasks. 
 
 
9.2 How Were High Rates of Savings and Investment Achieved in East Asia? 
                                                 
    
26
See Roderik (1994b), figure3. 
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The conventional neoclassical view ascribes East Asia's unusually high rates of savings and 
investment basically to sound 'fundamentals'. Specifically, it is suggested that prudent 
macroeconomic management, consequent low rates of inflation  and low exchange rate 
fluctuations, coupled with good initial conditions ( land reform, and hence relatively equal 
distribution of income and wealth,  favorable human capital endowment due to universal 
primary education) led to fast growth of household incomes and savings. In this account, 
some countries were subject initially to financial repression (eg Korea in the mid 1960s).   
But once this was eliminated and real interst rates became positive, household savings rose 
further, as did investment. 
 
The East Asian  Miracle represents a considerable advance on this simple orthodox story. In 
response to the criticisms of the neoclassical analysis, it accepts that fast growing East Asian 
countries did not eliminate financial repression. It also acknowledges that goverments in 
these countries adopted a host of measures to raise both the levels of savings and investment, 
as well as to influence the allocation of investments. It is, however, argued that the financial 
repression practised in these countries was relatively mild and that this did not adversely 
affect savings.  
 
UNCTAD (1994) and Akyuz and Gore (1994), in contrast, set out a more complex analysis of 
these issues. They argue that the wide range of measures in this sphere which the 
government in a country like Japan used during that country's rapid growth period were 
designed not just to promote household savings and national investment.  Rather, an 
essential government aim was to encourage corporate profits and savings.  The policy of 
protection against foreign competition as well as lax domestic competition policies, discussed 
earlier, were important factors in the growth of corporate profits in Japan.  High profits did 
not lead to high corporate dividends but rather to greater corporate savings and investment 
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for two reasons:  a) fiscal measures encouraging corporate retentions and b) the structure of 
share ownership which insulated the corporations from the pressure for greater dividend 
distributions from the shareholders and the stock market. 27  During its high growth period 
from 1950 to 1973, Japan's gross corporate savings ratio (retained gross profits as a 
proportion of corporate disposable income) averaged around 75%. Corporate savings as a 
proportion of GNP rose from about 7% in the mid-1950s to over 17% in the late 1960s. 
[UNCTAD, 1994, page 73.]   
 
  In  support of their contention, UNCTAD economists also point out that what distiguishes 
the exemplar East Asian countries from others is not their household savings, but rather their 
high corporate savings. They note that countries for which sectoral data are available, such as 
Colombia, Ecuador, India, Philippines and Turkey have had saving rates similar to or higher 
than those of the East Asian NICs.  However, business savings in Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand reached 9% of GNP, and in Taiwan 14%, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, whilst 
they were almost zero in the Philippines, under 2% in India, under 4% in Ecuador and 
Turkey and around 5.5% in Colombia.   
 
Similarly, Rodrik argues that, as a consequence of government interventions to address the 
problems of coordination failures with respect to investment, the corporate rates of profit in 
Korea rose considerably. The real rates of return to capital in Korean manufacturing are 
estimated to have ranged from 9 -18 per cent in the mid to late-1950s, 9-26 per cent in 1962 to 
1966, 16-38 per cent in 1967-1972, and 17-40 per cent after 1972. 28 
 
9.4 Assessment 
                                                 
    
27
. There is a large literature on this subject. See UNCTAD (1991), Singh (1993c). 
    
28
. Quoted in Rodrik (1994b). The original source of these figures is Hong (1977). 
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Although the East Asian Miracle represents a considerable advance on the simple 
neo-classical analysis, and recognizes the positive role of government interventions in the 
savings-investment process in the East Asian economies, it does not delve into the 
complexity of the process.  UNCTAD economists have provided a much more interesting 
and comprehensive analysis of the issues involved. If the UNCTAD/Rodrik analytical 
hypotheses are confirmed by more detailed evidence, their analyses would have very 
important policy lessons for other semi-industrial countries.  
  
  
10. INDUSTRIAL POLICY, NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM AND 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 
10.1  National System for Enhancing Technological Capabilities 
 
In addition to protection, domestic competition policy and other measures already discussed 
above, another important component of industrial policy in the exemplar East Asian 
countries has been a national strategy for technological development. Many Bank reports 
including the  East Asia Miracle, stress the importance of primary and secondary education 
for achieving economic growth. However, they do not pay sufficient attention to tertiary 
education and to the technological infrastructure both human and physical which late 
industrialisers require to catch-up with the advanced countries. Yet, it is precisely in these 
areas that the East Asian countries have excelled which in turn has played a major role in 
enhancing their international competitiveness and their outstanding export success.  
 
A national system of technological advancement was first advocated by Friedrich List in the 
first half of the 19th century to enable Germany to catch up with Great Britain. Although 
"catch up" was much easier then than it is for today's developing countries, many of List's 
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insights continue to remain valid.29 Following the end of World war II, the Japanese adopted 
a national technological system which spans the government, the firms, the universities, and 
indeed, the society as a whole. Freeman(1989) identifies following to be the principal 
elements of this natioanl techno-economic strategy. 
 
a.   The ability to design and redesign entire production processes, whether in shipbuilding, 
machine tools or any other industry. 
 
b.   The capacity at national, government level to pursue an integration strategy which 
brings together the best available resources from universities, government, research 
institutions, private or public industry to solve the most important design and development 
problems. 
 
c.   The development of an educational and training system which goes beyond the German 
level in two respects. First, in the absolute numbers of young people acquiring higher levels 
of education, specially in science and engineering. Second, in the scale and quality of 
industrial training which is carried out at enterprise level. 
 
d.   The policy of eschewing, as noted earlier, foreign investment as a principal means of 
technology transfer.  
 
e.   The emergence of a far more flexible and decentralised management system, permitting 
both greater horizontal integration of design, development and production and more rapid 
response to change. 
 
                                                 
    
29
 See further Freeman(1989) 
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f.   Close co-operation between the central government and Keiretsu (large conglomerate 
groupings in Japanese industries) in identifying future technological trajectories, and taking 
joint initiatives, to adopt these to enhance the country's prospective competitiveness. 
 
It is notable that many Asian countries including, Korea, Taiwan and currently China have 
been conciously following the Japanese model and building their own national technological 
systems in the light of their resources and requirements. It is striking that several Asian 
countries now have a higher annual output of graduate engineers per hundred thousand of 
population than Japan. These countries are thus trying to outdo Japan in this respect, just as 
Japan outstripped the United States. Freeman(1989) calls attention to the fact that the third 
country in the world to introduce and export 256K memory chips after Japan and USA was 
not an advanced industrial country but South Korea. It took that country less than thirty 
years, starting from a position of barely any industry at all, to become a leading player in the 
world electronics industry. 
 
None of the above is to under-estimate the formidable problems which the late industrialisers 
face just to keep in step with the fast pace of technological change in the world economy, let 
alone to catch up, Lall (1994) and others have pointed to the formidable technological and 
other barriers to entry30 in the world markets which LDC firms face. To meet these 
technological challenges, developing countries require a  continuing build-up of national 
technological capability  through an integrated system in the ways outlined above.  It is an 
incremental and long-term process requiring concerted national effort in which the 
government necessarily plays a leading direct, as well as a crucial coordinating role.  
Without such effort, countries like Korea or Taiwan would not have been able to hold their 
share of world manufacturing exports, let alone greatly increase them as they have so 
                                                 
    
30
 See Box 3.3 on Samsung industries, page 130,of the East Asian Miracle, which also confirms these 
points. 
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successfully done over the last two decades or more.       
 
To sum up, the World Bank emphasis on early education would not appear to be an adequate 
way of enhancing the international industrial competitiveness of semi-industrial countries. 
To compete in the world industrial economy, it is also essential to have higher educational 
institutions, scientists, technologists and engineers. Universal primary and secondary 
education is a worthy goal in its own right, but it does not provide the wherewithal to 
compete in the international market place. It is undoubtedly far more expensive on a per 
capita basis to provide higher education, than to provide primary or secondary schooling. 
The former is also necessarily elitist, but this is the price that has to be paid for seeking 
international competitiveness, a price that the East Asian countries have been willing to 
pay31. It is also useful in this context to go back to our earlier discussion of changing factor 
proportions and its implications for comparative advantage and structural changes in the 
economy. The essential point here is that the changing factor proportions (in the sense of 
human capital and skill formation), over time in the East Asian countries, werw not simply 
an outcome of 'natural market forces' as per capita income rose. Rather these developments 
were very much guided by the visible hand of the government in terms of its national 
priorities. 
 
10.2 Macro-economic Stability and Industrial Policy 
 
Finally, we come to another aspect of industrial policy which is not addressed in the World 
Bank documents. An important argument of the documents is that to achieve fast economic 
growth it is essential to get the "fundamentals" right; one of the most important of the latter is 
macro-economic stability.  The East Asian Miracle  recognises that macro-economic 
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.It is notable in this context that a considerable part of higher education and training in countries like 
Korea is financed privately, rather than being paid for entirely by the state. 
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stability is not a sufficient  condition for fast economic growth, but insists that it is a 
necessary condition.  It does not however explore the important links between industrial 
policy and macro-economic stability. To the extent that industrial policy was effective in 
Japan or Korea in relieving the balance of payments constraint, it will also have aided 
macro-economic stability.  A current account balance at the desired growth rate can help to 
avoid the stop-go cycles which many economies experience. This in turn will lower the cost 
of capital since for a given savings rate in the economy, other things being equal, the more 
variable and unstable the economic performance, the higher the interest rate. Similarly, as 
noted earlier, faster economic growth also leads to faster growth of real wages and hence 
enhances social stability and political legitimacy of the socio-economic order. Thus, 
macro-economic stabilisation and industrial policy interact with each other in a virtuous 
circle of cumulative causation.  
 
 
11.  UNRESOLVED ISSUES: AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
As detailed in the previous pages, there has been some progress in the debate between the 
World Bank and its critics concerning the outstandingly successful development experience 
of East Asian economies like Japan or Korea.  There is now general agreement that 
governments in these countries intervened heavily in all spheres of the economy in order to 
achieve rapid economic growth and fast industrialisation.  It is also common ground that 
during the course of their development these countries did not have free, flexible internal or 
external product and capital markets.  Although these countries were export-oriented, they 
eschewed close integration with the international economy in terms of imports,foreign direct 
investment and capital flows.    
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The experience of the exemplar East Asian countries thus comprehensibly contradicts a 
central thesis of Development Challenge that free, flexible, competitive internal and external 
markets are necessary for achieving fast long-term economic growth. The East Asian Miracle 
accepts that the governments controlled and guided the competitive process in these 
economies through a highly effective combination of inter-firm cooperation and oligopolistic 
competition. Moreover, as noted earlier, these countries achieved strategic integration with 
the world economy by integrating up to the degree and only in those spheres where it was 
desirable for them to do so in order to promote long term economic growth.   
 
Despite this perceptible narrowing of differences between Bank and heterodox economists, 
there clearly remain a number of important unresolved analytical and policy issues. Some of 
these have been discussed at length in this paper and will therefore only be listed below. 
Others, which for reasons of space could not be examined in the paper, will be commented on 
briefly here.  
 
The purpose of future research in this area is not simply to understand more fully East Asian 
development in all its complexity, but also to see how the lessons learned from that 
experience can be applied to other countries in  different individual circumstances and in 
changed world conditions. Based on the historical experience of East Asia and on trends in 
other developing regions, this research will therefore need to be imaginative and global. 
 
11.1 Unresolved Issues 
 
1. Industrial policy  
The role of industrial policy in East Asian development. In the light of the discussion in 
section 4, the specific questions in this area that need to be addressed are: 
a)   What constitutes an industrial policy? What is the inter-relationship between its various 
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components? 
 
b)   How should the effectiveness of industrial policy be assessed? 
 
c)   In the context of the new international trade regime which is soon to be instituted  
under the auspices of the World Trading Organisation (WTO), how will the industrial policy 
options of the developing countries be affected?  The broader related question here is, what 
will be the feasible and desirable degrees and forms of openness for developing countries 
under this new post-Cold War international economic system.   
 
In both these spheres, developing countries have a lot to learn from the post-1973 experience 
of Japan.  Most students of the subject would say that Japan has been carrying out a 
modified form of industrial policy even when it "graduated" from a developing into a 
developed country and therefore had to forego many of the industrial policy instruments 
which it was able to use in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
d)   the role of industrial policy in achieving macro-economic stability particularly in the 
long term, or to put it in terms of Bank economists' language - how does industrial policy 
affect the 'fundamentals' themselves? 
    
2. Savings and investment    
Here, as is evident from the discussion in section 9, the central issues are: 
 
a)   The role of the government in fostering corporate savings and investment;   
b)   The related issue is how precisely were household savings translated into investment 
either by the government or by corporations. Why were countries like India with as large 
household savings unable to achieve equally high corporate savings and investments as 
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those recorded by the East Asian economies? 
 
c)   How does the corporate sector finance its growth in the fast growing East Asian NICs? 
How has the emergence and development of stockmarkets in these countries affected the 
patterns of corporate savings and investments? 
 
d)   What is the contribution of physical capital accumulation and equipment investment to 
long term economic growth in these economies?  Can capital accumulation by itself explain 
most of the economic growth in these countries, as some recent research suggests? 
 
3. The Role of Demand and the Foreign Exchange Constraint 
 
Here, the central issues are: 
a)   How did the exemplar East Asian countries manage to achieve their desired balance of 
payments at such high long term growth rates of demand and output? 
 
b)   How did these countries succeed in changing their propensities to export and import 
manufactured products? 
 
c)   Arising from the recent literature, an important analytical question is whether or not the 
East Asian development has been export-led? 
 
d)   Why did the long-term rates of growth of total factor productivity fall in most regions, 
including East Asia, in the post-1973 period? 
 
4. Corporate Organization, Corporate Governance and Economic Development 
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Development economics, whether theoretical or empirical, has paid little attention to the role 
of the LDC firm. The literature discusses questions of capital accumulation by and large at 
the macroeconomic level. The question of investment allocation is indeed examined at the 
microeconomic level, but this is done within the context of cost-benefit analysis of investment 
projects. However, the literature has not adequately recognised that the leading actors in 
industrialisation in today's semi-industrial countries, including the exemplar East Asian 
economies, have been large domestic firms and their managements. We have not so far 
begun to develop an analytical perspective on the ways in which these entities carry out 
developmental tasks. 
 
The empirical research issues here are, how are these large firms organised in these 
economies? Who owns them and what is the nature of their governance structures? Are there 
particular forms of corporate organisation, and ownership and governance structures, which 
are particularly conducive to industrialisation and development?   
 
5. Domestic Competition Policy and the Relationship between Small, Medium and Large 
Firms 
 
Here, the central issue is what kind of competition policy will be most conducive to achieving 
dynamic efficiency, i.e., maximum long term rates of growth of productivity? What can other 
developing economies learn from the experience of the exemplar East Asian countries in this 
respect?  
 
6. Institutional Capacity and Economic Development 
 
An important argument of the East Asian Miracle is that most LDCs lack the institutional 
capacity to implement the state directed industrialisation of the Japanese or the Korean 
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variety. This argument is plausible but not necessarily valid.  
 
The important point to note here is that the Japanese model was itself imitated by the 
Koreans and by the Taiwanese.  When Korea  decided to embark on the Japanese model in 
the 1960s, as World Bank economists themselves admit, that country did not have the 
necessary institutional capacity. The Korean bureaucracy at the time was incompetent and 
corrupt, as indeed was the case with the Kuomintang bureaucracy when it arrived in Taiwan 
from mainland China.  Yet these countries were able to create the right kind of bureaucracy 
and the other necessary institutions required for implementing the Japanese model. If these 
institutions can be created by Korea and Taiwan, and later on by Malaysia or Indonesia, 
surely it must be possible to establish them in many other countries elsewhere as well?   
 
The most important research questions in this area are: what lessons with respect to 
institutional innovation and imitation can we draw from the experience of these East Asian 
economies?  How did these countries enhance their institutional capacity to be able to 
impose performance standards on large firms with respect (a) to exports and (b) to the 
implementation of other aspects of industrial policy?   What practical measures can the 
Bretton Woods Institutions take to help the developing countries in this area? 
 
 
7. Asian Success  and Latin American Failure in the 1980s 
 
As noted in Section 7, our entire perception of which countries are the postwar successes and 
which are the failures depends crucially on our assessment of the nature and magnitude of 
the external economic shocks suffered by  the leading Latin American and Asian countries 
during the decade of 1980s. Until then, as we saw, a country like Brazil was growing at much 
the same long-term rate as Korea or Taiwan. If more comprehensive and detailed research 
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were to confirm the heterodox view that the Latin American debacle in the 1980s was due 
largely to the greater magnitude of the external shocks that these countries suffered, rather 
than because of their inherent internal deficiencies, one's assessment of what are the right 
lessons of the last 40 years' development experience would be rather different from that of 
the Development Challenge or East Asian Miracle. In view of the crucial bearing the subject 
has on the entire BWI analytical and policy edifice, and in view of the conflicting analyses 
and conclusions of the leading scholars in this area, there is clearly a pressing need for further 
research.  The specific research questions here are: 
 
a)   What is the relative importance of external economic shocks and internal factors in the 
Asian success and Latin American failure in the 1980s?   
 
b)   Apart from the question of  inter-continental differences in economic performance, the 
related research question is that of the intra-continental uniformity of experience. In 
particular, how can one explain the more or less universal economic success of Asian 
countries in the 1980s despite their wide diversity of policies?  It is significant in this context 
that a country like India was succesful in the 1980s even though it continued to implement by 
and large its traditional Brazillian type import substitution model. 
 
8. Income and Wealth Distribution 
 
A striking aspect  of the successs of the examplar East Asian countries is that they have been 
able to achieve fast economic growth while maintaining relatively equal distribution of 
income. There are however important questions which arise in this context which require 
investigation. 
 
What has happened to wealth distribution? It is well known that in Japan or Korea, the land 
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reform under US auspices, led to an initial equal distribution of income and wealth. 
However, as seen earlier, in the subsequent industrialisation of these countries, corporate 
profits and savings and investment incresed enormously. Industrial concentration may not 
have increased but it has remained high. [ Amsden and Singh, 1994]. One would expect in 
these circumstances, other things being equal, the wealth distribution in the urban economy 
to become more unequal. UNCTAD economists suggest that there is indirect evidence that 
this is what has actually happened. If so, this may require revision of political economy 
interpertations which are extant and which assume that neither income or wealth 
distribution worsened during the last three decades.  
 
In the light of the above useful research questions in this area would be: 
 
a)   How did wealth distribution within the urban economy change during the periods of 
fast growth of these exemplar economies? 
 
b)   If the wealth distribution, despite high corporate profits, savings and investments in 
these countries did not become more unequal over time what market or non-market 
mechanisms prevented that?  If it did become more unequal, what were its implications for 
the political economy of these countries? 
 
9.  Training, Skills and the Labour Market 
 
The very fast economic growth of the exemplar East Asian economies was naturally 
accompanied by, and indeed was contingent upon, enormous changes in their economic 
structures.  The governments in these countries therefore intervened in different ways in 
two crucial areas of labour markets.  
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1.   Management of conflict arising from this structural change. 
 
2.   Provision and expansion of the necessary skills in the labour force required for bringing 
about the structural transformations.32 
 
The relevant research question here is, what lessons can other developing countries draw 
from the experience of state interventions in the labour markets in the East Asian countries in 
guiding and managing these huge structural changes? 
   
      
    
                                                 
    
32
For an excellent discusssion of these issues with respect to the labour markets in Korea, see You and 
Chang (1993). 
